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Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market:
From Caveat Emptor to Consumer
Protection
Stephanos Bibas*
Padilla v. Kentucky was a watershed in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s turn to regulating plea bargaining. For decades, the Court
had focused on jury trials as the central subject of criminal
procedure, with only modest and ineffective procedural regulation of
guilty pleas. This older view treated trials as the norm, was
indifferent to sentencing, trusted judges and juries to protect
innocence, and drew clean lines excluding civil proceedings and
collateral consequences from its purview. In United States v. Ruiz in
2002, the Court began to focus on the realities of the plea process
itself, but did so only halfway. Not until Padilla last year did the
Court regulate plea bargaining’s substantive calculus, its attendant
sentencing decisions, the lawyers who run it, and related collateral
civil consequences. Padilla marks the eclipse of Justice Scalia’s
formalist originalism, the parting triumph of Justice Stevens’s
common-law incrementalism, and the rise of the two realistic exprosecutors on the Court, Justices Alito and Sotomayor. To complete
Padilla’s unfinished business, the Court and legislatures should look
to consumer protection law to regulate at least the process if not the
substance of plea bargaining.

Copyright © 2011 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
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Margaret Colgate Love, Curtis Reitz, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, and Ronald Wright for their helpful
comments on and conversations about earlier drafts. The author served as counsel for amici curiae
in support of petitioner at the certiorari stage, and then as of counsel for petitioner at the merits
stage, in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last year in Padilla v. Kentucky marks
a watershed in the Court’s approach to regulating plea bargains. Padilla held
that, before a guilty plea, criminal defense counsel must advise clients not only
about the plea’s direct criminal consequences, but also about one of its chief
collateral civil consequences, deportation.1 While Padilla’s holding is limited to
deportation, its reasoning could reach much further. Padilla is a landmark
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel,
but it is much more than that. The Court began to move beyond its fixation upon
the handful of cases that go to jury trials. It recognized that the other 95 percent
of adjudicated cases resolved by guilty pleas matter greatly, and began in earnest

1.

130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
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to regulate plea bargains the way it has long regulated jury trials.2 Though the
Court’s shift in emphasis is nascent, it is long overdue and welcome.
To understand Padilla’s grand implications, one must first appreciate the
Court’s historical focus on jury trials. In recent decades, the Supreme Court has
promulgated exacting procedures to regulate jury trials. For example,
prosecutors must now produce live witnesses in court (instead of routine lab
reports) and prove aggravating facts to juries beyond a reasonable doubt.3 But
even as trial procedures hypertrophied, plea bargaining remained all but
unregulated, a free market that sometimes resembled a Turkish bazaar.
The Court’s indifference to pleas reflected both practicality and principle.
The judicial system had grown addicted to plea bargaining, relying on guilty
pleas to resolve the vast majority of criminal cases, and could not afford to
stifle this trade.4 Courts, assuming that innocent defendants would not plead
guilty and that parties plea bargain in the shadows of expected trial outcomes,
counted on jury trials as backstops to protect defendants. Additionally, the Bill
of Rights provided no explicit protections for plea bargaining.
Much criminal procedure thus resembled a Potemkin village, a finelooking facade inhabited by few. The Court trusted the shadows cast by trials to
regulate plea outcomes, even though few defendants dared risk the huge
penalties for going to trial. And because most guilty pleas waive defendants’
rights to appeal, few typical guilty-plea cases ever reached the Supreme Court.
The Court continued to filigree procedures for atypical jury trials, heedless of
their effects on the overwhelming majority of cases resolved by plea.
The last decade has seen its continuing share of anachronistic formalism
focused on jury trials.5 But the Court has slowly begun to scrutinize bargaining
in the real world of guilty pleas, beginning with United States v. Ruiz in 2002.6
2. In 2004, of 582,480 felony convictions in state courts, 95 percent resulted from guilty
pleas. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics
Online, tbl.5.46.2004, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462004.pdf. In fiscal year 2009,
of 86,798 criminal cases disposed of in federal district court by trial or plea (thus excluding
dismissals), 96.4 percent were disposed of by pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. Id. at
tbl.5.24.2009, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242009.pdf. Though it is impossible to be
sure, most of these pleas probably resulted from plea bargains.
3. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text; Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.
Ct. 2527, 2542 (2009).
4. As Chief Justice Burger remarked in a 1970 speech to the American Bar Association,
even a small reduction in guilty-plea rates would have immense consequences. “A reduction from
90 per cent to 80 per cent in guilty pleas requires the assignment of twice the judicial manpower
and facilities—judges, court reporters, bailiffs, clerks, jurors and courtrooms. A reduction to 70
per cent trebles this demand.” Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929,
931 (1970). See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (“Whatever might be the
situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain
are important components of this country’s criminal justice system.”). See generally GEORGE
FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003)
(arguing that plea bargaining has grown inexorably to handle crushing caseloads).
5. See, e.g., infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
6. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
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Ruiz held that prosecutors need not disclose impeachment or affirmativedefense evidence during plea bargaining, but its reasoning appreciated
somewhat how plea bargains differ from trials.7 With Padilla, the Court has
now begun to interpret due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
to impose meaningful safeguards on the plea process.
Padilla is the Court’s first case to treat plea bargaining as a subject worthy
of constitutional regulation in its own right and on its own terms. By heeding
plea-bargaining realities and evolving professional norms, the seven-Justice
majority began to drag the law into the twenty-first century. The academy and
the bar grasped the complexity of the plea process first, and the Court then
recognized the consensus they had developed.8 Padilla represents the eclipse of
Justice Scalia’s eighteenth-century formalism in criminal procedure, the parting
triumph of Justice Stevens’s common-law incrementalism, and the emergence
of Justices Alito and Sotomayor’s prosecutorial pragmatism. One can at least
hope that the Court will persist in this new direction. Plea bargaining is no
longer an insignificant corner of the market reserved for indisputably guilty
people who need no protection beyond caveat emptor. Over the protests of
Justices Scalia and Thomas, a solid majority of the Court at last sees that plea
bargaining is the norm; sets the going rate; and needs consumer regulation and
competent counsel to make it intelligent, voluntary, and just. That is a welcome
first step, but it will also require rulemaking and legislation to complete the
consumer-protection analogy.
Part I of this Essay sketches the Court’s laissez-faire approach from
roughly 1970 to 2000. It explores the assumptions underlying the Court’s handsoff approach to plea bargaining even as the Court hypertrophied trial procedures.
Part II then discusses Ruiz as a transitional moment on the Court, in which
the Justices began to assess the realities of bargaining, albeit incompletely.
Part III explains how Padilla at last recognizes that plea bargaining is now
the norm and thus deserves tailored protection in its own right. I connect the
dominance of bargaining to broader notions of innocence and injustice. I then
explore how Padilla reconceives the roles of institutional actors and looks
beyond simplistic bright-line dichotomies. I also weigh the concurring and
dissenting Justices’ objections to the Court’s rule. Padilla, I conclude, reflects
the eclipse of Justice Scalia’s formalist originalism, the parting triumph of
Justice Stevens’s common-law incrementalism, and the rise of Justices Alito
and Sotomayor’s prosecutorial realism.
Part IV steps back to consider what broader reforms would help to
complete the Padilla project. Since the criminal process is far too complicated
and opaque to leave defendants at the mercy of caveat emptor, it is time to

7. Id. at 633. See also infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text (explaining Ruiz’s
reasoning).
8. See infra notes 122–125 and accompanying text.
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consider regulations modeled on consumer protection law. Padilla may prompt
legislatures, rules committees, and bar authorities to complement the Court’s
work. Finally, I conclude that the prosecutorial outlook of Justices Sotomayor
and Alito, rather than traditional ideological divides, helps to explain the
Court’s new plea-bargaining realism.
I.
THE TRIAL MODEL AND THE INVISIBILITY OF PLEAS
From the 1970s through the early 2000s, plea bargains resolved the vast
majority of criminal cases in the United States. But the Supreme Court’s case
law remained stuck in the eighteenth century. Even as the Court noted and
blessed the prevalence of pleas, its frame of reference remained the selfcontained criminal jury trial, uncluttered by sentencing or civil considerations.
A. Efficiency, Originalism, and Formalism
The Court adopted its hands-off approach to plea bargaining for an odd
blend of reasons, ranging from sheer efficiency to anachronistic originalism.
The seminal plea-bargaining cases, from around 1970, speak the technocratic
language of efficiency. As Chief Justice Burger once wrote, plea bargaining “is
an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered,
it is to be encouraged.”9 Plea bargaining, he reasoned, handles large caseloads
with a minimum of judicial and court resources.10 It has the added virtues of
being prompt, final, and increasing rehabilitation and incapacitation.11 Justice
White praised plea bargaining’s efficiency in similar terms in Brady v. United
States, which upheld the use of promises of leniency to induce plea bargains.12
Over the past decade or so, the Court’s originalist decisions have reached
roughly the same result for very different reasons. They have declined to
regulate plea bargaining because it is not a jury trial protected by the Sixth
Amendment. Though Apprendi v. New Jersey held that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees jury findings of all facts that aggravate maximum sentences, it
exempted facts admitted by defendants.13 In his ringing originalist opinion in
Blakely v. Washington, which extended Apprendi to facts that aggravate
sentences under sentencing guidelines, Justice Scalia emphasized that
defendants can freely waive Apprendi rights in plea bargaining.14 (Set aside
the anachronism that Article III’s jury right was meant to be a nonwaivable

9. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (vacating and remanding because a
prosecutor failed to honor an earlier prosecutor’s commitment, as part of a plea bargain, to make
no sentence recommendation).
10. See id.
11. Id. at 261.
12. 397 U.S. 742, 752–53 (1970).
13. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000).
14. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004).
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structural check, so plea bargaining did not and could not exist in the
eighteenth century.)15
These holdings are not only originalist, but also formalist. Jury trials enjoy
bright-line protection, while defendants who plead guilty can easily waive all of
their rights. Twice, Justice Scalia has emphasized the need for a bright-line rule
to protect jury trials (unless defendants choose to waive them).16 More
generally, Justice Thomas has emphasized a strong presumption that all rights
are waivable in plea bargaining as part of the laissez-faire give-and-take.17
Criminal procedure thus becomes a binary on/off switch, fully enforced at jury
trials but simply inapplicable in plea bargaining. The problem with bright-line
rules such as Apprendi is that their edges are clear and so easy to evade,
particularly when the rule is freely waivable.18
These themes of efficiency, originalism, and formalism are evident in the
parts that follow. As Parts I.B and I.C discuss, the Court’s focus on trials and
lack of concern with sentencing tracked eighteenth-century procedures. This
focus also reflected the practical difficulties of regulating off-the-record plea
negotiations and advice. The Court’s faith in neutral judges and juries, noted in
Part I.D, reflected the same considerations. And by dividing pleas from trials,
civil collateral consequences from criminal sentences, and omissions from
commission, the Court avoided thorny line-drawing issues. As Part I.E
explains, the Court’s blinders blocked out factors beyond those characterizing
the historical jury trial.
B. Trials as the Norm
The most notable feature of the pre-Padilla landscape is that trials
remained the norm, the touchstone guiding the Court. Though the Court
occasionally acknowledged the prevalence of pleas, until Padilla it did not
cultivate rules tailored to make bargaining fair and substantively just.19 The
focus of its criminal procedure regulation has long been ensuring fair trial
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury”
(emphases added)); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1196–99 (1991).
16. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306–08, 310. See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498–99 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“What ultimately demolishes the case for the dissenters is that they are unable to say
what the right to trial by jury does guarantee if [not Apprendi’s bright-line rule]. They provide no
coherent alternative.”). I have argued elsewhere that Justice Scalia’s originalism and formalism
have powerfully shaped criminal procedure in recent years, particularly in the Apprendi and Blakely
lines of cases. See Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The
Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005).
17. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200–03 (1995) (adopting a presumption of
waivability, and holding that defendants may waive rules that exclude from evidence statements
made during plea negotiations).
18. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 198.
19. For early Supreme Court cases acknowledging the prevalence or importance of guilty
pleas or plea bargains, see Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
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procedures. A wide variety of doctrines reflect that trial emphasis. The Court
has long required neutral decision makers at trial and steadily restricted
discrimination in jury selection.20 Rules of evidence and motions in limine
structure the presentation of proof for the jury’s consideration. Brady v.
Maryland and Giglio v. United States require turning over exculpatory and
impeachment evidence that jurors would likely find material in time for its
effective use at trial.21 The requirements of confrontation and crossexamination of witnesses ensure live, adversarial testing of the prosecution’s
case in front of the jury.22 The privilege against compelled self-incrimination is
so robust that it prevents even adverse comments on defendants’ silence at
trial.23 The Court’s cases on proof beyond a reasonable doubt shape instructions
to juries about when there is enough evidence to convict.24 And, in 2000,
Apprendi read the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee to require jury
findings beyond a reasonable doubt of all facts that aggravate maximum
sentences.25 The law of criminal procedure is primarily a law of trials and
preparation for trials.
The Court’s perspective reflected its criminal docket, which was (and still
is) skewed toward reviewing convictions at trial. Most guilty pleas forfeit most
rights that defendants could otherwise appeal.26 Defendants often waive many
other rights in plea bargaining, even the right to appeal itself, so
disproportionately few plea issues reach the Court.27
20. E.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (forbidding judges to have direct monetary
interests in the outcomes of cases); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (forbidding race
discrimination in criminal jury selection); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)
(extending Batson to sex discrimination).
21. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (exculpatory material); Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment material).
22. E.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (forbidding the use at trial of
testimonial hearsay by nontestifying declarants); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
(forbidding admission at joint trials of confessions implicating the accused by nontestifying
codefendants).
23. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
24. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
for criminal convictions); see also Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam) (reversing
a criminal conviction because defective reasonable-doubt instruction permitted jury to convict
based on insufficient proof).
25. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). See also Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (applying Apprendi to facts aggravating maxima under sentencing
guidelines).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575–76 (1989) (holding that a guilty
plea barred a later double jeopardy claim that relied on additional evidence); Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258, 266–67 (1973) (same, for claim of race discrimination in selecting grand jury);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 768–71 (1970) (same, for coerced-confession claim). A
few types of claims are not automatically forfeited by a plea. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S.
61, 62 (1975) (per curiam) (double jeopardy claim); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974)
(vindictive prosecutorial charging; describing these claims as exceptional because they undercut
“the very power of the State” to charge the defendant).
27. See, e.g., Cowan v. Superior Court, 926 P.2d 438, 441–43 (Cal. 1996) (allowing waiver
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When the Court has reviewed guilty pleas, it has usually considered only
the amount of knowledge defendants must have before waiving procedural trial
rights.28 On this view, the plea process can remain effectively unregulated so
long as the trial remains a regulated backstop. Plea bargaining supposedly takes
place in the shadow of expected trial outcomes, so regulation of trials should
theoretically protect plea-bargaining defendants as well.29 For the shadow of
trial to work, defendants need know only that they are giving up their trial
rights. Thus, plea colloquies must warn defendants that they are waiving their
rights to jury trials, confrontation, and protection against self-incrimination.30
The intricacies of the Rule 11 plea process, built upon this constitutional
minimum, are almost exclusively procedural.31 The judge need mention only
the rights being waived, the nature of the charges, the maximum and minimum
penalties, and the vague existence of sentencing guidelines, and elicit a
minimal factual basis for the plea.32 Judges need not opine on the likelihood of
conviction, the probable sentence within the range, or the advisability of the
bargain. On the contrary, the majority of jurisdictions forbid judges to take any
part in bargaining.33
of statute of limitations); People v. Allen, 658 N.E.2d 1012, 1014–15 (N.Y. 1995) (same, for
double jeopardy); People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 1024–26 (N.Y. 1989) (same, for waivers
of the right to appeal); see also Nancy J. King, Priceless Process: Non-Negotiable Features of
Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113 (1999) (noting trend towards allowing waiver of all
rights except constitutional claims that affect third parties). The Court has accelerated this trend by
itself blessing plea-bargained waivers. E.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200–02,
210 (1995) (adopting a presumption of waivability and enforcing a waiver of the inadmissibility
of statements a defendant made during plea negotiations).
The existence of appeal waivers, however, does not entirely explain the dearth of pleabargaining case law. Defendants can enter conditional guilty pleas, expressly reserving their rights
to appeal specified pretrial issues. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2). And it does not explain the
paucity of case law on issues that go to the validity of the plea, such as the Ruiz issues of when
and how prosecutors’ Brady obligations attach.
28. E.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (holding that, at guilty-plea colloquies,
judges need not advise defendants of the specific risks of waiving counsel and proceeding pro se);
McMann, 397 U.S. at 770–71 (1970) (holding that “a defendant’s plea of guilty based on
reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel
may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession”); Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (holding that, to demonstrate that a guilty plea is voluntary, the record must
reflect that the defendant affirmatively waived his rights to a jury trial and to confront his
accusers, as well as his privilege against compelled self-incrimination).
29. I have critiqued this widespread assumption. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
30. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242–43.
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. Rule 11 establishes the federal procedures for plea bargaining and
has served as a model for many states. E.g., HAW. R. PEN. P. 11; TENN. R. CRIM. P. 11; VT. R.
CRIM. P. 11; W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 11.
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1), (b)(3).
33. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-302(1) (2006); GA. UNIF.
SUPER. CT. R. 33.5(A). For cogent criticism of this judicial reticence, see Albert W. Alschuler,
The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1123–34 (1976).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that judges do on occasion participate in plea bargaining,
sometimes in violation of local rules. One study found that about a third of judges nationwide
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The underlying justification for this laissez-faire approach is that plea
bargaining is a positive good and that defendants can decide for themselves
when bargains serve their interests.34 In 1970, in Brady v. United States, Justice
White explained that plea bargains serve everybody’s interests: defendants who
stand little chance of acquittal get reduced sentences, avoid burdensome trials,
and get their cases over with.35 In theory, by admitting guilt, they show that
they are more open to rehabilitation and so need less punishment. The
government saves time and money for cases that need it and increases the
swiftness of punishment. This “mutuality of advantage” supposedly makes plea
bargaining rational, fair, and efficient.36 Trials remain as benchmarks against
which both sides can measure their mutual advantages and as fallbacks against
bargaining coercion.
On this account, defendants can freely and voluntarily choose to plead
guilty. The only limitations are that they must face no threats,
misrepresentations, or bribes, and have competent counsel and time to weigh
the pros and cons of trial.37 While recognizing that the plea process “is no more
foolproof than full trials,” the Court expressed confidence that judges at plea
hearings would ensure the accuracy and reliability of convictions to prevent
convictions of the innocent.38 But that judicial oversight need not screen out
many pleas. Even a defendant who protests his own innocence can plead guilty,
so long as the prosecutor and defense lawyer furnish a “strong factual basis” by
articulating the facts they would prove at trial.39 And the ban on threats and
promises conveniently exempts those threats and promises integral to the plea
process, such as promises of leniency and threats of heavier charges.40

attended plea negotiations, most often reviewing the parties’ recommendations but occasionally
making their own. Where rules clearly forbade participation in plea bargaining, judges were much
less likely to attend, but some still did. John Paul Ryan & James J. Alfini, Trial Judges’
Participation in Plea Bargaining: An Empirical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 479, 484–90
(1979). Cf. Allen Anderson, Judicial Participation in the Plea Negotiation Process: Some
Frequencies and Disposing Factors, 10 HAMLINE J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 43–49, 57 (1990) (reporting that “[j]udicial participation in the plea negotiation process, in varying forms, is widespread,”
based on a study of North Carolina, which expressly authorizes judges to participate).
34. Frank Easterbrook has made this free-market argument powerfully several times. Frank
H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309–17 (1983);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1974–75 (1992).
35. 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
36. Id. at 752–53. See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260–61 (1971).
37. Brady, 397 U.S. at 752, 754–55.
38. Id. at 758.
39. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970).
40. The landmark approval of lawful threats as part of the rough-and-tumble of plea
bargaining is Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362–65. For a cogent critique of
Bordenkircher’s opening the floodgates to unfettered plea bargaining, see William J. Stuntz,
Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE STORIES 351 (Carol Steiker ed., 2006).
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The Court put great faith in competent defense counsel as the only
substantial safeguard.41 As long as lawyers offered competent advice, even if
they turned out to be wrong in hindsight, defendants supposedly could
forecast whether pleas served their self-interests.42 That romanticized vision,
however, ignored the workloads, underfunding, and agency costs that beset
defense lawyers and the difficulties of proving incompetence on undeveloped
plea records.43
Also, like many economists, the Court’s account assumed that the parties
had good information and treated uncertainty as a mere matter of rationally
forecasting probabilities of conviction.44 The Court seemed to presume that
most defendants know their own guilt and the evidence likely to be marshaled
against them at trial.45 That stylized assumption collided with the reality that
criminal discovery is far less expansive than civil discovery, even though

41. Here and over the next several pages, I discuss more generally the Court’s tacit
assumptions for more than three decades, from the 1970s through the early 2000s. One cannot
rigorously prove such generalizations, particularly when it comes to proving negatives, such as the
Court’s failure to advert to the realities of plea bargaining. For a concrete example, however, of an
opinion that would have been written differently had the Court not made these assumptions and
instead assessed plea bargaining more realistically, see my discussion of United States v. Ruiz.
Infra Part II.
42. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769–71 (1970). See also Libretti v. United
States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995) (“Apart from the small class of rights that require specific
advice from the court under Rule 11(c), it is the responsibility of defense counsel to inform a
defendant of the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement and the attendant statutory and
constitutional rights that a guilty plea would forgo.”).
43. Albert Alschuler’s classic examination of defense lawyers remains the best study of
their role in plea bargaining. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180 (1975) (describing the assumption that defense counsel will
adequately safeguard their clients’ interests in plea bargaining as “often more romanticized than
real”). I have contributed to this literature, in particular by discussing the problems of gauging ineffectiveness in hindsight. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2476–86; Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of
Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1.
44. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L.
& ECON. 353, 361–62 (2006) (“In most cases, key evidence, including the defendant’s statement
to the police and the identity of the main witnesses, is common knowledge. In many jurisdictions,
law or prosecutorial practice guarantees that defendants receive the most significant information
collected by the prosecution, thus minimizing private information on the prosecution side.”); see
also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756–58 (1970) (treating the decision to plead guilty as
“intelligently made” because it is based on “the defendant’s appraisal of the prosecution’s case
against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency”); McMann, 397 U.S. at 770–71
(suggesting that “uncertainty is inherent in predicting court decisions” and that predicting likely
outcomes is a normal part of defense counsel’s job).
45. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–39 (1970) (stressing that
“[w]hether [Alford] realized or disbelieved his guilt,” upon his lawyer’s advice he had rationally
decided to plead guilty “[b]ecause of the overwhelming evidence against him”). Cf. Bar-Gill &
Ayal, supra note 44, at 361 (economic model assuming good information through common
knowledge and discovery, particularly defendant’s knowledge of his own guilt); Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1936–37 (1992) (stressing
that defendant’s knowledge of his own guilt gives him “a major piece of information that” the
prosecutor lacks).
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criminal defendants have far more at stake.46 It also ignored the many
psychological biases and heuristics that color defendants’ assessments of their
own cases in plea bargaining.47
The Court’s view of trial-based plea bargaining was thus rather idealized
and static. It focused on the law on the books, such as the elements of the
crime, the statutory punishments, and especially the procedural rights exercised
or waived. The Court did not consider or did not care that plea bargaining
would likely undercut or pervert trial regulations in practice.48 And it assumed
that good information and competent counsel would suffice to ensure rational,
orderly, trial-based bargaining within these boundaries. That assumption was
far too rosy.
C. Guilt Without a Sense of Sentencing
Until the early 2000s, the Court’s world was binary: defendants were
either guilty or not guilty. It ignored the varieties of possible charges and the
gradations of sentences that might fit a crime. It assumed that guilt alone
matters and that defendants know their own guilt. Innocent, intoxicated, and
insane defendants, however, may not know the evidence against themselves.
The Court may also have assumed that innocent defendants would not confess
or plead guilty, but DNA exonerations show that a fraction do, especially
mentally retarded and juvenile defendants.49 Even typical defendants may not
know or be able to use potentially mitigating sentencing facts. Poor lawyering,
for example, can impede defendants’ efforts to cooperate with government
investigations.50 And lack of discovery can prevent them from showing at
sentencing that their victims suffered little lasting harm.
In this vein, the Court also neglected the importance of sentencing to plea
bargaining. It took trials as the norm and thus post-trial punishments as the
normative baseline. Prosecutors can lawfully threaten any charges and
46. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case . . . .”); Bibas, supra note 29, at 2493–96.
47. I have explored this problem at length elsewhere. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2496–2519.
48. I have argued at length that the Court erred by writing criminal procedure decisions
such as Apprendi for the 5 percent of cases that go to trial, heedless of how the parties would
circumvent or pervert these rules in the 95 percent of cases that plead guilty. Stephanos Bibas,
Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J.
1097, 1148–51 (2001).
49. Compare, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757–58 (1970) (doubting that
inducements to plead guilty “substantially increased the likelihood that” innocent defendants
would plead guilty), with Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1051, 1064 (2010) (reporting that mentally ill, mentally retarded, and borderline mentally
retarded defendants composed 43 percent of DNA exonerees who had falsely confessed; 65
percent of false confessors were mentally disabled, under eighteen at the time of the crime, or
both), and Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 181
(2008) (discussing a study of 340 nonrandomly selected defendants who pled guilty, finding that 6
percent were later exonerated).
50. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2485–86.
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sentences which they have probable cause to bring. Against this backdrop, plea
offers look like favorable discounts. Hence, some courts hold that a defendant
can never be prejudiced by an attorney’s error that causes him to go to trial,
because he has not been deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial.51 That
static picture misses an important fact: now that bargaining is the norm, its
existence warps the baseline penalties. Legislatures multiply overlapping
criminal statutes and inflate sentences to give prosecutors extra plea-bargaining
chips.52 Charges are not exogenously specified by natural law, but endogenous
to the criminal process. A range of possible overlapping charges can fit a single
transaction or episode, and prosecutors have discretion to choose among them
to reflect their own senses of justice, their desires to achieve pleas, or any
number of reasons. When prosecutors threaten inflated post-trial sentences to
induce pleas, defendants are less free to test their guilt at trial.53 Defendants
may be better off if they play the game well but much worse off if they do not.
Ignoring sentencing was at least understandable in the older world of
indeterminate or unstructured sentencing. Through most of the twentieth
century, most statutes set only broad punishment ranges. Judges enjoyed almost
unfettered discretion within those ranges, so lawyers could not confidently
predict eventual sentences or the facts that would influence them. Much was
left to the discretion of parole authorities, who made their rehabilitative
decisions much later, on the back end.54 But over the last four decades, the
truth-in-sentencing movement has abolished or greatly restricted parole in
many states.55 At the same time, the federal and many state systems have
adopted mandatory minimum penalties and structured sentencing guidelines.
Particularly in the federal system, specific facts trigger predictable sentencing
consequences, as do charge bargains, sentence bargains, and decisions to
cooperate with police and prosecutors.56 Investigation and negotiation over
51. E.g., United States v. Springs, 988 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook, J.); State
v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1190 (Utah 2007); Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.3d 795, 802 (Mo. Ct. App.
2004) (finding no prejudice); State v. Monroe, 757 So.2d 895, 898 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (same). See
also infra note 116 for information about next Term’s cases, Lefler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye.
52. Bill Stuntz beautifully exposed this phenomenon in William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 534–38, 546–52 (2001).
53. Studying plea and conviction statistics across the second half of the twentieth century,
Ronald Wright concludes that many federal defendants who would otherwise have been acquitted
at trial have increasingly pleaded guilty instead. He blames this development in substantial part on
increased prosecutorial power. Federal prosecutors, he notes, have become increasingly able to
threaten large penalties for going to trial and to promise large rewards for pleading guilty. Ronald
F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 79, 84–86, 100–12, 129–37, 150–54 (2005).
54. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 159–63, 304–06 (1993); KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9–10, 18–21 (1998).
55. See PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 170032, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATES PRISONS 1, 3 (1999), available
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf.
56. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2483–91.
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these factors predictably influence whether sentences track what defendants
deserve.57 And, increasingly, certain convictions trigger automatic collateral
consequences, such as deportation or sex-offender residency restrictions.58 By
the start of the twenty-first century, the Court’s blindness to sentencing and
related consequences had grown antiquated.
D. Faith in Neutral Arbiters
The Court’s preoccupation with trials had another important component. It
trusted that public trials run by neutral judges and juries would discipline both
sides, develop factual records for appellate scrutiny, and ensure justice. It
assumed that trial judges remained informed overseers who could referee
disputes between prosecutors and defense counsel. They could do so
knowledgeably, based on their first-hand exposure to the evidence at motions
hearings and trials. There was little sense that judges usually played reactive
roles, dependent on the parties’ representations about the facts and pressured to
rubber-stamp plea bargains as faits accomplis.
Likewise, the Court has traditionally seen protecting juries as a central
part of its mission. It has elaborated the Batson line of cases to protect the
representative jury as the conscience of the community.59 It interpreted the
Confrontation Clause in Crawford to ensure that jurors hear live witnesses and
can gauge their reliability.60 And it has protected juries’ role in authorizing
maximum sentences under the Sixth Amendment’s Jury Trial Clause. Apprendi
and its progeny emphasized that juries must check judges’ and prosecutors’
decisions to punish defendants for aggravated crimes.61
The Court appears to have understood these arbiters as fairly simple,
static, and unitary. The vision was one of strict, static separation of powers, not
of fluid checks and balances; there was little sense of a dialogue among the
various actors or branches, let alone the kind of game that characterizes plea
bargaining. The Apprendi dissenters would have preserved more leeway for
legislatures and sentencing commissions to experiment by, for instance,
adopting sentencing guidelines.62 The Blakely dissenters argued for flexible,
dynamic judicial discretion to counteract prosecutors’ charge-bargaining power
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (deportation); Corey
Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 101 (2007) (sex offender residency restrictions).
59. E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
60. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
61. E.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 490 (2000).
62. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550–52 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 560–66 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Concurring, Justice Scalia mocked these “admirably fair and efficient” reforms as a
“bureaucratic realm of perfect equity” divorced from the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of trial by
jury. Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and Procrustean sentences.63 The majorities in both cases, however, rejected
these functionalist arguments for fairness and cooperation among the branches.
Instead, they placed their faith in juries as a brake on judges and prosecutors.
That faith assumed, of course, that there were still meaningful numbers of jury
trials left to save. The majorities also assumed that juries authorize punishments
in some meaningful sense, even though they cannot be told and must not
consider the likely sentences.64
E. Clean Dichotomies
Finally, the Court’s traditional approach to plea bargaining assumed
several neat categories dividing various areas of law. It assumed clear lines
between guilty pleas and jury trials, and between the guilt phase and sentencing
proceedings. It focused on regulating guilt verdicts at trial. It thus trusted that
forecasted trial verdicts would cast shadows on the substance of plea bargaining, obviating much procedural regulation of pleas. It put its faith in proceedings on the record, easily subject to review by trial and appellate judges.
An even bigger oversight was the artificial separation of criminal from
civil and, in particular, of direct criminal consequences from collateral civil
ones. The criminal proceeding was a self-contained unit with well-defined
aims: the prosecution sought a verdict of guilty on the exogenously specified
charge, while the defense sought a complete acquittal on the same single
charge. Judges and criminal lawyers could control and had to explain only
those consequences labeled criminal, not civil. Thus, for example, the
protections of double jeopardy do not apply to civil penalties.65 At plea
colloquies, judges had to explain only the direct consequences of a plea, such
as the minimum and maximum sentences and any fine, forfeiture, or
probation.66 Other consequences fell beyond the sentencing judge’s purview.
The neat walls between criminal and civil, and between direct and
collateral consequences, have steadily eroded in recent years. Statutory reforms
have increasingly specified that certain crimes trigger deportation and have
made it automatic.67 Other laws have mandated registration, housing and job
restrictions, and even civil commitment of those convicted of certain sexrelated crimes, even minor ones such as consensual teenage sex.68 Drug crimes
63. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 330–40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Compare Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (asking whether an enhancement “expose[s] the
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict”), with Shannon
v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 587 (1994) (reiterating “the rule against informing jurors of the
consequences of their verdicts” and rejecting a proposed exception).
65. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101–03 (1997).
66. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b)(1)(H)–(M).
67. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478–80 (2010).
68. See, e.g., WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 49–84 (2009); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is
Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea
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likewise carry many collateral consequences.69 The distinction between a threeday prison sentence and the deportation or civil confinement triggered by that
sentence has become increasingly arbitrary. Defendants might care much more
about the latter, and the lawyers might well trade off criminal against civil
consequences via plea bargaining to make the overall penalties fit the crime.
Finally, the Court’s laissez-faire approach assumed a sharp line between
sins of commission and mere omissions. The state could not misrepresent the
facts or affirmatively conceal evidence.70 But judges and prosecutors had little
responsibility to assist the defense.71 The state’s obligation was simply to avoid
obstructing the defense and to provide minimal procedural information at the
plea colloquy. It had no obligation to offer any substantive guidance on the
merits of a proposed disposition. Defense lawyers might offer sound advice,
poor advice, or simply tell their clients to take pleas without much explanation.
Often, defendants were largely on their own in discerning whether a proposed
plea deal was favorable, had strings attached, or was a bluff to hide a
prosecutor’s weak hand.
***
By roughly the turn of the millennium, the Court’s criminal procedure
jurisprudence had grown quite lopsided. It focused on unrepresentative Cadillac
jury trials, embellished with cumbersome procedures, to protect defendants
against overbearing state power. The Court reviewed disproportionately fewer
guilty pleas, and when it did it took a hands-off approach. The very same state
against which defendants needed to be protected at trial could issue any number
of lawful threats in bargaining. It could thus induce most defendants to
surrender their Cadillac trials in exchange for scooter plea bargains.
Prosecutors easily circumvented the hypertrophied protections for 5 percent of
cases in the remaining, lightly regulated 95 percent. Plea waivers had to follow
elaborate scripted procedures to ensure that defendants knew they were waiving
a host of procedural rights of little interest to them. Yet the waiver process was
oddly silent about the substantive advisability of the sentences and
consequences being offered, and it required far less than proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The plea process trusted defendants and their lawyers to
figure out their interests with little help or safeguard. Given the chronic
Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 176, 179–80, 182–83 (2009); Yung, supra note 58; Sex Laws:
Unjust and Ineffective, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, at 21 (giving example of a seventeen-year-old
girl who had to register publicly as a sex offender for performing fellatio on a boy aged fifteen
years, eleven months).
69. Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253 (2002).
70. E.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935).
71. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (“The government is not
responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, [defense] attorney errors . . . .”); Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a
criminal case . . . .”).
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problems of overworked, underfunded, incompetent, and conflicted defense
counsel, that assumption was myopic.72
II.
RUIZ AND A DAWNING APPRECIATION OF PLEA REALITIES
So matters stood until about a decade ago. In 2002, the Court in Ruiz had
to grapple with a new plea-bargaining phenomenon: the rise of fast-track guilty
pleas, which waive even more rights than usual in exchange for steep discounts.
In many ways, as Part II.A notes, Ruiz extended the Court’s previous
incomprehension of plea bargaining. In approving fast-track pleas, the Court
continued to focus on fair trials and trusted defendants to know their own guilt.
Yet, as Part II.B explains, some of Ruiz’s reasoning evinced a greater
appreciation of both the benefits and pitfalls of plea negotiations. Ultimately,
Ruiz was unclear on just how much the Court would modify its hands-off faith
in plea bargaining.
A. Continued Emphasis on Proof of Guilt at Trial
Judicial districts in southwestern America, near the Mexican border, have
been overwhelmed with far more immigration and drug cases than they can
handle. In response, federal prosecutors in many of those districts developed
fast-track plea-bargaining programs. The seminal program required defendants
to waive indictment, forego motions, plead guilty immediately, waive
presentence reports, stipulate to a particular sentence, agree to immediate
sentencing, consent to deportation, and waive all sentencing and deportation
appeals. In exchange, prosecutors stipulated to sentences substantially below
what defendants would have received after trial.73
Angela Ruiz was caught smuggling thirty kilograms of marijuana into the
United States. As part of a fast-track program, prosecutors offered Ruiz a sixmonth discount, reducing her sentencing guidelines range from eighteen-totwenty-four months down to twelve-to-eighteen months. They represented that
the government had already turned over and would continue to turn over any
known information showing the defendant’s factual innocence. The proposed
plea agreement, however, asked defendants to waive their rights to
impeachment information and evidence supporting affirmative defenses, in
addition to many of the other waivers listed above.74 The questions for the
Court were whether Brady and Giglio entitled defendants to impeachment and

72. See generally, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S
CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004).
73. Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Margin: Reinventing
Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 301 (1998).
74. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002).
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affirmative-defense information during plea bargaining and, if so, whether
these discovery rights were waivable.75
The Court held that there is no constitutional right to this discovery before
a plea, for several reasons.76 First, Brady and its progeny recognized a due
process right to a fair trial. When the government lays its cards down on the
table at trial, the Court implied, the jury needs to see impeachment information
to complete the picture.77 But during plea bargaining the government need not
reveal the incriminating evidence, so there is no need to disclose prematurely
the impeachment evidence or affirmative defenses undercutting it.78
Concurring, Justice Thomas went further, saying that Brady was limited to
ensuring fair trials, not providing helpful information in time for a plea.79 The
Court evinced little appreciation of the need to guide defendants in making
informed, reasoned decisions.
Second, voluntariness does not require full discovery or knowledge of all
incriminating evidence. Defendants can waive rights if they understand them
generally, even if they cannot foresee the specific detailed consequences of
invoking those rights. They have no right to full discovery or full information.
Indeed, they may plead guilty even if they misunderstand the evidence against
them or the law likely to apply to them.80 And the importance of impeachment
information will vary depending on how much defendants independently know
about the prosecution’s case,81 not based on how likely they are to be innocent.
Third, the Court dismissed the fear that poor information might harm
innocent defendants. At trial, failure to reveal impeachment evidence could
lead a jury to convict erroneously. But innocent defendants are very unlikely to
plead guilty, the Court assumed. It reasoned that the prosecution’s continuing
promise to turn over exculpatory evidence and the procedural safeguards of
Rule 11 diminish the risk of a false guilty plea.82
At oral argument, several Justices showed even less concern about the
justice of plea-bargaining outcomes. Justice Scalia assumed that defendants
would know their own defenses,83 which is often true of self-defense but less
true of entrapment and the like. Justices Souter and Ginsburg stressed that Ruiz
had admitted guilt, suggesting that she had no need for discovery to know her

75. Id. at 628.
76. Id. at 625.
77. Id. at 629–30.
78. Id. at 629–30, 633.
79. Id. at 633–34 (Thomas, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 629–31 (majority opinion).
81. Id. at 630.
82. Id. at 631 (stating that the factors noted in the text allay the fear “that, in the absence of
impeachment information, innocent individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty”).
83. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (No.
01-595) (“[I]t’s impossible for [a defendant] not to know whether he was acting in self-defense.”
(Scalia, J.)). See http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_595/argument.
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own guilt.84 Justice Scalia went further, stressing that our system never permits
or encourages innocent defendants to plead guilty. On his view, more discovery
would merely tell a defendant “what the house odds are . . . before he rolls the
dice by pleading guilty.”85 At best, he implied, this discovery would encourage
tactical gamesmanship by the guilty; at worst, it would encourage innocent
defendants to enter false pleas of guilty.86
Note here the continuing impact of the classic trial model. The game is a
static one, in which defendants know their guilt and the likely sentences after
trial versus plea. They are rational and well informed, able to weigh probabilities and uncertainties. Trials set normative baselines, which plea bargains
simply sweeten. Innocent defendants know their innocence and will not be
tempted to plead, and the categories of guilt or innocence are black and white.
It did not help that Ruiz’s case, like many of the fast-track cases, was
open and shut, with an unequivocal admission of guilt and no apparent
defense.87 That setting only sharpened the Court’s dichotomy between the
guilty and the innocent. It also stripped away any justification other than
gamesmanship for discovery.
Even so, a couple of Justices saw beyond the dichotomy between guilt and
innocence. At oral argument, Justice Breyer stressed that prosecutors wield
overwhelming power in plea bargaining, which could tempt innocent
defendants to plead guilty. Providing more information, he noted, could help to
counterbalance prosecutors.88 And Justice Souter disagreed with Justice Scalia,
noting that innocent defendants might indeed enter Alford guilty pleas, but that
more information about weaknesses in the prosecution’s case might thus steel
their resolve to vindicate themselves at trial.89
These few caveats expressed at oral argument were not reflected in the
Ruiz opinions. Nor did the Court evince much appreciation for the different
types of information at issue. The Court spent most of its opinion discussing
impeachment information, which is tangential to the evidence of guilt. Only in
one paragraph at the end did it extend the same reasoning to evidence of
affirmative defenses.90 But affirmative-defense evidence can be far more
central to blameworthiness and guilt than impeachment information. Evidence
84. Id. at 28–29.
85. Id. at 12.
86. Id. at 19–20 (“I mean, there’s something wrong with a legal system that . . . is even
contemplating [encouraging innocent defendants to plead guilty.]”); id. at 26 (“There is nothing in
our system that encourages or even allows an innocent person to—to plead guilty. And I would be
horrified if—if there were something like that.”); id. at 32–33 (“Other provisions of our laws make
it very clear that we are not to accept guilty pleas from innocent people,” and defendants do not
need discovery to know if they have a possible self-defense claim or the like).
87. Id. at 38–39 (noting the oddity of considering the issue in a case with no suggestion of
innocence).
88. Id. at 17–18.
89. Id. at 34–35. See http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_595/argument.
90. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
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of a murder victim’s history of aggression, for example, could be highly
relevant to self-defense. Yet murder defendants may not have access to rap
sheets and other evidence documenting past violence. Drug defendants are even
less likely to know that their suppliers were government agents who entrapped
them. Ruiz’s rule will apply to many cases where evidence of guilt is less clear
and more important to innocent or less blameworthy defendants.
B. A Dawning Awareness of the Plea Process
Alongside Ruiz’s old-style thinking, however, were passages reflecting a
more modern, nuanced understanding of pleas, one that weighed the need for
discovery against its costs. The majority opinion stressed that the Government
had not sought waiver of its bedrock obligation to disclose classic exculpatory
evidence. As noted, the Court took comfort in the prosecution’s representations
that it had and would continue to disclose exculpatory evidence.91
Given the backstop of the prosecution’s promise of disclosure, the Court
felt more secure trading off the need for additional discovery against other
goals. Defendants have some interest in gathering enough information to make
informed decisions and guard against bluffing. But, on the other side of the
scales, the Court accorded substantial weight to the Government’s
countervailing reasons for nondisclosure.92 As the Court recognized, the
Government has a strong interest in securing efficient guilty pleas by factually
guilty defendants who are willing to plead.93 Discovery of impeachment
information risks revealing undercover officers and confidential informants, as
well as exposing prospective witnesses to tampering, threats, and violence.
Congress and Federal Rules Committees have thus drawn existing witnessdisclosure requirements carefully to minimize these risks.94
1. Impeachment Evidence
The Court saw that it would be too burdensome to force the Government
to turn over all impeachment evidence in time for plea bargaining.95 It should
also have emphasized the costs to defendants of fettering free trade. Plea
bargaining expands the pie by freeing the government to seek more convictions
at a lower cost per case. In exchange, the government splits the gains from
trade, rewarding individual defendants with lower sentences. Reducing the
91. Id. at 631; supra text accompanying note 82.
92. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 (noting that due process balances a defendant’s interest and need
for information against the Government’s interest in not disclosing information). Justice Thomas
disclaimed even this modest, pragmatic balancing. Id. at 633–34 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (declining to join majority opinion because he drew a bright line between the plea and
trial stages, irrespective of how important the information might be to defendants before
pleading guilty).
93. Id. at 631 (majority opinion).
94. Id. at 631–32.
95. Id. at 632.
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ability to keep undercover officers and cooperating witnesses confidential
greatly decreases their future usefulness. Exposing witnesses to tampering and
threats harms innocent witnesses and reduces their willingness to come
forward. These are entirely legitimate reasons why the government bargains for
nondisclosure, not nefarious ones aimed at hiding a weak case. If the
government cannot save these costs, it will be much less willing to bargain and
will offer correspondingly less generous terms. Defendants, as well as the
government, would be worse off if they could not bargain away their right to
inflict these costs.
2. Affirmative Defense Evidence
It is not at all clear that the same analysis applies to evidence of
affirmative defenses, which need not come from a protected witness. A
vestigial paragraph at the end of Ruiz quickly analogized this evidence to
impeachment material, without considering whether the costs and benefits are
comparable.96 Perhaps much of this information ought to be waivable, but that
would require subtler analysis of the costs of disclosure and the relevance of
the information to a defendant’s just deserts. Evidence relevant to a statute of
limitations or entrapment defense is largely divorced from a defendant’s
blameworthiness. Evidence of excuses such as duress and insanity is somewhat
more relevant. Classic justifications such as necessity and self-defense are
central to blameworthiness and guilt, so the costs of nondisclosure for these
defenses would be highest, but on the other hand defendants may be likely to
know the evidence that would help them.
Unfortunately, the facts in Ruiz did not raise these issues in any concrete
way. Angela Ruiz was caught red-handed and had no possible defense. It was
hard to imagine a credible claim of self-defense or insanity bearing on her guilt
of drug smuggling, so the affirmative-defense waiver was entirely theoretical.
Perhaps Ruiz inverts the famous maxim and shows how easy cases can make
bad law. How will Ruiz apply when the withheld evidence is highly relevant to
the grade of crime or the sentence deserved?
For several years after Ruiz, the Court did not return to consider these
issues again in earnest.97 Not until the end of the decade did the Court focus on
96. Id.
97. The Court touched on them only in passing in 2004 in Blakely. There, Justice Breyer
worried about how the Court’s jury-trial guarantee for sentencing facts would play out in practice,
given the prevalence of plea bargaining. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 337–38 (2004)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Bibas, supra note 48, at 1100, 1150-51 & n.330). Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia’s originalist opinion simply assumed that bargained-for waivers would
allow plea bargaining to go on undisturbed. Id. at 310–11 (majority opinion). He evinced substantial concern for the fairness of indictments and jury trials but little for plea bargaining, because
any metric of the fairness of plea bargaining “is not the one the Framers left us with.” Id. at 312.
In 2005, the Court held that defendants who plead guilty need appointed lawyers to help them
navigate appellate complexities, but did not express a broader appreciation of plea bargaining.
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how its criminal procedure rules could and should influence the dynamics of
guilty pleas.
III.
PADILLA CONFRONTS THE REAL WORLD OF GUILTY PLEAS
Until 2010, the Supreme Court had never focused on collateral
consequences of guilty pleas or defense lawyers’ duty to advise clients about
them. In Padilla, the Court squarely confronted the issue. Jose Padilla, a
Honduran and U.S. permanent resident for decades, was charged with felony
trafficking in marijuana. He asked his lawyer whether pleading guilty would
expose him to deportation. His lawyer erroneously assured him that he “did not
have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so
long.”98 That advice was flatly wrong; the drug-trafficking crime qualified as
an aggravated felony and so triggered automatic deportation under federal
law.99 Relying on the misadvice, Padilla pleaded guilty. When he learned of the
lawyer’s mistake, he collaterally attacked his plea in state court, alleging that he
would have gone to trial but for his lawyer’s mistaken advice.100 The Supreme
Court held that a lawyer’s failure to advise a noncitizen defendant about
deportation can violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel if it prejudices his decision.101
This Part analyzes the large shifts in landscape wrought by the Padilla
tremor, which may develop into an earthquake. Part III.A notes that the Court’s
frame of reference now treats bargaining as the norm, not the eighteenthcentury jury trial enjoyed by only a few percent of defendants. Part III.B
considers the Court’s broader definitions of innocence and injustice, which
incorporate sentencing and other substantive considerations rather than just
procedural trial rights. Part III.C emphasizes Padilla’s shift in focus away from
trial judges and juries towards the prosecutors, defense lawyers, and
rulemaking bodies who bargain or regulate plea bargains. The Court should
include sentencing commissions within its ken as well. Part III.D praises the
erosion of the neat analytical compartments that had walled off on-the-record
from off-the-record proceedings, criminal from civil, direct from collateral
consequences, and acts from omissions. Part III.E argues that the better
objections to Padilla are not Justice Scalia’s eighteenth-century formalistic
ones, but Justice Alito’s twenty-first-century practical concerns. It appraises
Padilla as the eclipse of Justice Scalia’s formalist originalism, the ascendancy
of Justices Alito and Sotomayor’s prosecutorial pragmatism, and the parting
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005).
98. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477–78 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
99. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i) (2006).
100. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
101. Id.
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triumph of Justice Stevens’s common-law incrementalism. The key, open
question is whether the new prosecutorial pragmatism will sustain its traction
as Justice Kagan and other new Justices join the Court.
A. Recognizing Plea Bargaining as the Norm
One of the most important points in Padilla is not highlighted in the
Court’s opinion but largely implicit. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion
mentions only in passing that today, 95 percent of criminal convictions result
from guilty pleas and only 5 percent result from trials.102 Plea bargaining is no
longer a negligible exception to the norm of trials; it is the norm. Nor, given
information deficits and pressures to bargain, can we simply trust in an efficient
plea market that reflects full information about expected trial outcomes. Thus,
plea bargaining needs tailored regulation in its own right, not simply a series of
waivers of trial rights.
Trials no longer set a fixed, normative baseline. The expected post-trial
sentence is imposed in only a few percent of cases. It is like the sticker price for
cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm
and anything less as a bargain. The term plea bargain, then, risks being
misleading. Mental anchoring need not focus on post-trial baselines.103 In a
world of bargaining, a much wider range of potential outcomes is on the table.
Thus, the Court recognizes that a competent defense lawyer “may be able to
plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and
sentence” that suits both sides’ interests.104
This vision of “creativ[e] . . . craft[ing]”105 radically revises the Court’s
earlier assumption that trial outcomes were normative. Under the former view,
any lesser conviction or sentence was an act of grace, largely unregulated
except to ensure voluntary waivers of sacred trial procedures. Now, the Court
sees that the law is not fixed but variable. It creates a multifarious spectrum of
outcomes, both direct and (nominally) collateral, both criminal and civil. A
single criminal episode often supports multiple charges. Counsel can thus
charge-bargain down to crimes that may not require deportation in exchange
for dismissal of charges that do.106 In exchange, defense counsel can offer
102. Id. at 1485, 1486 n.13.
103. People come up with and evaluate numbers by focusing on a reference point (an
anchor) and then adjusting up or down from that anchor. This anchor may come, for example,
from the expected sentence after trial, the initial plea-bargaining offer, the statutory maximum
sentence, or even a completely random or irrelevant number. Because people usually do not adjust
away from their anchors enough, their initial choice of anchors has an inordinate effect on their
final result. See Bibas, supra note 29, at 2515–18. In this context, focusing on the post-trial
sentence as a baseline will make even a mediocre plea bargain look like a good discount off the
sticker price. In contrast, focusing on the average plea-bargained result will make a mediocre plea
bargain look like a bad deal.
104. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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restitution, forfeiture, or cooperation with the government against other
defendants, increasing the size of the pie and splitting the gains from trade.
Even begging the prosecution or judge to reduce a jail sentence by one day,
from 365 to 364 days, can make all the difference in avoiding automatic
deportation.107 Charges and sentences are not exogenously specified by some
neutral rule, but endogenous to the bargaining process.
Since Padilla, the Supreme Court has reiterated this understanding of plea
bargaining as a complex tradeoff of risks. In Premo v. Moore, the Court
recently rejected a habeas challenge to a defense lawyer’s advice to take a
quick plea bargain.108 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court rightly stressed
that “[p]lea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with
uncertainty, and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in
balancing opportunities and risks.”109 Parties reasonably trade that uncertainty
for substantial discounts, to purchase finality, even as they know that their and
the other side’s evidence may wax or wane.110 If courts second-guess these
bargains in hindsight based on scanty records, prosecutors will have less
incentive to offer favorable bargains and everyone will lose.111 Thus, the early
signs are that Padilla was not a one-off decision but may have heralded the
dawn of a new era.
B. A Broader Understanding of Injustice
Related to the baseline of pleas is a broader evaluation of what makes a
plea just. The Court’s concern now reaches beyond a defendant’s factual guilt
of a charge to evaluate whether the punishment is fitting. The Court had
previously taken baby steps in this direction, applying some criminal
procedures to post-trial capital sentencing.112 Some capital sentencing law
treated defendants who are factually guilty of the crime as being innocent of
deserving the death penalty.113 And, in the last decade, the Apprendi line of

107. See, e.g., State v. Quintero Morelos, 137 P.3d 114, 116, 119 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006);
NORTON TOOBY & JOSEPH ROLLIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE OF IMMIGRANTS § 10.1 (4th ed. 2007).
108. 131 S. Ct. 733, 746 (2011).
109. Id. at 741.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 741–42, 745–46.
112. The Court’s early regulation of sentencing occurred primarily in capital cases, leaving
it unclear how thoroughly the Court would apply these procedural doctrines to noncapital cases.
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984) (applying effective-assistanceof-counsel test to capital sentencing proceedings, while leaving open whether the same test would
apply equally at noncapital sentencing); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (defining,
in the context of a capital case, material that prosecutors must disclose to defendants as evidence
that would tend either to exculpate the defendant or to reduce the penalty).
113. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992) (defining capital defendants as
“innocent of the death penalty” for purposes of habeas corpus exception wherever they can show
innocence of the capital crime, or that there was no required aggravating factor, or that another
requirement for death eligibility had not been met).
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cases regulated judicial findings of fact that raised sentences.114 But Padilla
squarely recognized that, to make bargaining just, defendants need information
to evaluate bargained-for sentences.
Defendants care about much more than just guilty verdicts and
convictions. While convictions may be foregone conclusions in many cases,
where defendants are caught red-handed with no defense, the punishments need
not be. As noted, defendants face a spectrum of possible outcomes even after
conviction. Thus, they need to weigh “‘the advantages and disadvantages of a
plea agreement,’” compared with other possible pleas as well as compared with
trial.115 The Court has never expressly recognized that a defendant can suffer
prejudice if his lawyer’s error causes him to strike a worse plea bargain or go to
trial.116 Some lower courts have rejected the idea, but others have taken that
logical next step.117
This understanding of prejudice need not degenerate into endorsing
gamesmanship and raw partisan advantage. In a market-based plea system,
defendants need information and the advice of repeat players to get the going
rate. The going rate amounts to equal treatment, not some unfair advantage
over others. Once one stops viewing trials as setting the normal and normative
baseline, one need not denigrate good defense lawyering as thwarting normal,
just outcomes. While the plea bargaining market is grossly flawed in other
ways, the fault does not lie with defense lawyers who are simply doing their

114. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
115. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010) (quoting Libretti v. United States,
516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995)). See also id. at 1486 (suggesting alternative possible plea bargains).
116. In formulating its test for when a lawyer’s ineffectiveness prejudices plea bargaining,
the Court described prejudice as “causing [a defendant] to plead guilty rather than go to trial. . . .
This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely
would have changed the outcome of a trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Though the
Court did not consider the possibility of two alternative possible plea bargains, its binary framing
of plea versus trial appeared to foreclose such prejudice claims. See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct.
733, 743, 745 (2011) (applying Hill’s standard, that an error must have affected a defendant’s
decision to plead guilty instead of going to trial, to bar a claim that a defense lawyer should have
obtained a better plea bargain, though Premo arose in the context of deferential review of a statecourt decision on habeas corpus based on what standard was clearly established). Next Term, in
Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court will consider whether a defendant can
be prejudiced by a defense attorney’s error if the error causes him to go to trial. Lafler v. Cooper,
376 F. App’x 563 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 856 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2011) (No. 10-209);
Missouri v. Frye, 311 S.W.3d 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 856 (U.S. Jan. 7,
2011) (No. 10-444).
117. Compare United States v. Springs, 988 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook, J.)
(rejecting the possibility of prejudice), State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1190 (Utah 2007) (same),
Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.3d 795, 802–04 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (same), and State v. Monroe, 757
So. 2d 895, 898 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (same), with Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1091–92
(10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (finding prejudice), reh’g denied, 583 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2009),
and Commonwealth v. Mahar, 809 N.E.2d 989, 993 (Mass. 2004) (same).
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jobs.118 As long as plea bargaining exists, the solution must be to improve the
market’s flaws rather than to drive it underground.
Of course, in the old days and even today in many states, unstructured
sentencing kept sentences from being controllable or extremely predictable. But
even in these states, going rates and informal expectations develop among the
repeat players in the market.119 And with the growth of mandatory minimums,
sentencing guidelines, and collateral consequences, many defendants and their
lawyers have even more power to predict and influence outcomes through
bargaining. As sentencing laws have grown more complex, defendants must
increasingly rely on their lawyers to navigate options and pull levers that
greatly affect sentences. Good defense lawyers must know, for example,
whether a defendant’s small children, ill health, apology, cooperation, or
restitution can lower his sentence.120 Unfortunately, because not all defense
lawyers are experienced repeat players, not all are aware of these opportunities.
Defense lawyers may even misadvise clients about sentencing guidelines and
the likely sentences they face.121 As a result, some defendants may receive
higher sentences than others simply because they could not afford to hire better
lawyers.122 They may be guilty of the crimes, but may not deserve sentences as
harsh as the ones they receive. Plea-bargaining doctrine should try to guard
against these charge and sentencing inequities, not just convictions of the
innocent. Padilla is a step in that direction.
C. The Roles of Lawyers, Not Just Arbiters
Related to the nature of the plea-bargaining market is Padilla’s
appreciation of the actors who run it. In a world of trials, the crucial guarantor
of fairness would be a full presentation of the evidence to a neutral judge and
jury. If defendants chose to give up those sacred trial rights, judges’ jobs would
be to make sure they understood all the procedures that they were forgoing. The
pre-Padilla plea-bargaining model assumed that judicial oversight of plea
agreements and the shadows cast by jury trials would regulate the actions of
both defense and government counsel and hence protect defendants. In other
118. See generally Bibas, supra note 29 (cataloguing the structural forces and
psychological biases that warp plea bargains, causing them to diverge from expected trial
outcomes).
119. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 90, 120–21 (1977) (finding, in a qualitative empirical study
before the advent of sentencing guidelines, that defense lawyers develop confidence in their
ability to predict plea-bargained outcomes and learn to cite prior dispositions to prosecutors,
establishing going rates for particular crimes).
120. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2483–84.
121. See United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 939–40 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining to find
defense lawyer ineffective for mistakenly calculating sentencing guidelines range as 46 to 57
months, instead of 262 to 327 months, because it was not clear whether the lawyer had failed to
investigate and appreciate the implications of a past parole revocation).
122. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2477–86.
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words, forecasted jury-trial verdicts in theory determined plea-bargained
results, and judges still supervise plea colloquies as if those waivers of
procedural rights are the heart of plea-bargain decisions. But Padilla recognized that these institutional actors—juries, judges, and counsel—play different
roles in real plea bargains. The key to plea bargaining is not the plea colloquy,
but the bargaining and advice that precede it. Particularly because judges are
absent from that bargaining, defense lawyers must actively negotiate and
competently advise their clients on whether a bargain is substantively desirable.
1. Judges
With the dearth of jury trials, juries are all but absent from defendants’
plea decisions. Judges likewise play far smaller roles in plea bargaining than
the trial model supposed. Far from actively managing the plea-bargaining
process, judges are passive and reactive. They can neither investigate nor
advise about the tactics and merits of pleas. Their job is to recite boilerplate
plea colloquies to ensure that defendants understand the charges, the direct
consequences of conviction, and the procedural rights they are waiving.123
Those colloquies also seek to expose any coercion, threats, misrepresentations,
or improper promises.124 The federal system and many states forbid judges to
take part in the bargaining.125 One variety of plea bargain, a stipulated-sentence
agreement, binds the judge to a particular sentence if the judge accepts the
agreement.126 Other, nonbinding sentence bargains leave judges free to impose
different sentences.127 But even for nonbinding bargains, because there has
been no trial at which they could hear the evidence, judges must depend on the
parties’ selective presentation of the facts.128 That reactive posture encourages
judges to rubber-stamp the parties’ recommendations. Judges can, however,
inquire about whether defense lawyers are doing their jobs. Thus, judges may
ask whether defendants are satisfied with their lawyers’ representation and
whether their lawyers have had time to explain the bargains to them.

123. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
124. See id.
125. See supra note 33.
126. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
127. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B), (3)(B).
128. Some systems have probation officers prepare presentence investigation reports to
provide judges with neutral, more complete information in time for sentencing. The thoroughness
and independence of these reports is open to question, however, as probation officers may
themselves depend on the parties for their information. See Benjamin L. Coleman, In Defense of
Hopper: Raising the Burden of Proof for Dramatic Increases Under the Guidelines, 12 FED.
SENT’G REP. 225, 226–27 (2000) (reporting author’s personal observation that “it is rare for a
probation officer to conduct an independent investigation of the offense conduct, such as
reviewing transcripts, interviewing witnesses, or inspecting a crime scene”); Probation Officers
Advisory Group Survey, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 303, 305–06 (1996).
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2. Defense Counsel
Against this newly acknowledged backdrop of limited judicial
involvement, the Padilla Court turned to defense counsel’s role in looking out
for defendants’ best interests. Justice Scalia’s dissent would have stopped at the
status quo, suggesting that defense lawyers need offer no more advice than
judges must offer at plea colloquies.129 But the majority rightly rejected his
conflation of two distinct roles. Judges can remain detached precisely because
they can rely on defense counsel to do their jobs. “[I]t is the responsibility of
defense counsel”—not the court at a plea colloquy—“to inform a defendant of
the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement.”130 Defense lawyers, not
judges, investigate cases and defendants’ particular circumstances before pleas.
Defense lawyers, not judges, offer their clients opinions and strategic advice.
The market system relies on lawyers’ professional sense of the going rates.
Criminal defendants are often poor and uneducated and may not even speak
English. They often have poor or erroneous information and rely on experts to
correct them. The old caveat emptor approach is woefully inadequate for
defendants navigating the intricacies and inequities of modern plea bargaining.
As the Court recognized, defendants must not be “left to the ‘mercies of
incompetent counsel.’”131
The difference between judges’ and defense counsel’s roles goes hand in
hand with different doctrinal bases for regulation. The font of early pleabargaining regulation was Boykin v. Alabama, which interpreted the Due
Process Clause to require judges to ensure knowledge, voluntariness, and a
factual basis for pleas.132 Conversely, Brady v. United States limited judges’
due process obligations to ensuring “ful[l] aware[ness] of the direct
consequences” and the absence of threats, misrepresentations, bribes, and the
like.133 But the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel
is broader, guaranteeing performance “within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”134 It is not just a negative right to be
129. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496 n.1 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651)
(question by Justice Scalia). While Justice Scalia did not decide the point, he implied that neither
defense lawyers nor judges must advise about collateral consequences to ensure that pleas are
knowing and voluntary. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting authorities
for the propositions that “awareness of ‘direct consequences’ suffices for the validity of a guilty
plea” and that Rule 11 colloquies, which “d[o] not mention collateral consequences,”
“approximate[] the due process requirements for a valid plea”).
130. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50 (1995).
131. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (majority opinion) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
132. 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
133. 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2
(5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam)).
134. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770–71 (1970). See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 56–59 (1985) (quoting this language from McMann and applying it to guilty-plea
context).
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free of threats, lies, and bribes, but a broad positive right to effective assistance
whenever the state seeks to imprison a criminal defendant. The Court’s
touchstone formulation of the content of the right to effective assistance,
Strickland v. Washington, requires not a fixed set of actions, but “simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”135
The role of prevailing professional norms for defense counsel is a key
difference between Strickland and Rule 11 (and analogous state rules). While
Strickland does not mechanically copy American Bar Association (ABA)
standards, it looks to them as guideposts for determining reasonableness.136 So,
unlike the static set of procedures imposed top-down by Rule 11, Strickland’s
standards are dynamic and bottom-up. The law responds and evolves in light of
the bar’s expectations and accumulated wisdom over time. This is an incremental, common-law, Burkean approach to change, quite unlike formalistic brightline rules that freeze clear procedures in place. Thus, Padilla stressed that
whether an attorney’s performance was deficient was “necessarily linked to the
practice and expectations of the legal community.”137 Those practices and
expectations have evolved in response to changes in immigration law that made
deportation a far more common and automatic consequence of criminal convictions.138 The Court looked to bar publications, criminal defense organizations,
treatises, and scholars to confirm that its rule reflected prevailing norms.139
Thus, the Court limited its ruling to the context of deportation, leaving for
another day whether other so-called collateral consequences might merit
similar treatment.140 In a later case, the Court can consider the prevailing norms
and practical considerations governing loss of child custody, for example.
This dynamic understanding of prevailing professional norms
accommodates the important roles of resource allocation and discretion.
Defense lawyers often must juggle many cases and lack the resources to litigate
every aspect of every case exhaustively. They must perform triage, and
prevailing norms guide them in exercising their discretion to allocate resources
while still representing their clients zealously. Now that the bar recognizes the
importance of deportation to many clients, bar organizations have developed
training materials and guides for criminal defense lawyers.141 In allocating their
limited time and resources, lawyers need incentives to exercise their discretion
135. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
136. Id.
137. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). See also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 26–28, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651) (questions by
Breyer, J.) (stressing that Strickland’s reliance on “prevailing professional norms” defies reduction
to a simple rule forbidding misadvice or permitting nonadvice).
138. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480, 1482–83 (noting recent changes in immigration law
that have made deportation an automatic consequence and citing an array of recent publications
instructing defense lawyers to advise their clients about that risk).
139. Id. at 1482–83.
140. Id. at 1481–82.
141. Id. at 1482–83; see also Roberts, supra note 68, at 147–48.
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properly. The Court declined to limit its rule to misadvice because permitting
nonadvice would have “encouraged [lawyers] to say nothing at all.”142 Since
information about deportation is crucial for many defendants and often easily
available, defense lawyers ought to provide it.143
Though Padilla did not cite it, its development of ineffective-assistance
standards for pleas mirrors its recent ineffective-assistance standards for capital
sentencing. For many years, Strickland appeared to be toothless, requiring little
of defense counsel.144 But over the last decade, the Court has looked to ABA
standards to require capital defenders to investigate mitigating evidence for
sentencing.145 Defense lawyers have little excuse for not even investigating
mitigating evidence, while the defendant’s need for mitigating evidence to
ensure a just sentence is enormous. Likewise, they cannot simply avoid
mentioning deportation, let alone misadvise about it, because it “may be more
important to the client than any potential jail sentence.”146
3. Prosecutors
While defense lawyers were the central actors in the Padilla drama,
prosecutors play important roles as well. As the former head of the National
District Attorneys Association wrote, prosecutors “must consider [collateral
consequences] if we are to see that justice is done.”147 “How can we ignore a
consequence of our prosecution that we know will surely be imposed by the
operation of law?”148 Prosecutors must consider that collateral consequences
make victims less likely to press charges, defendants less likely to plead guilty,
and judges more likely to lower charges and sentences.149 As Padilla astutely
noted, prosecutors can choose to offer creative plea bargains that avoid
deportation, giving defendants powerful incentives to plead guilty. More
informed bargaining can thus benefit prosecutors as well as defendants.150
Prosecutors also have incentives to ensure that defendants get accurate

142. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1857–65 (1994); Richard Klein, The
Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 640–45 (1986).
145. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524
(2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000). See generally John H. Blume & Stacey D.
Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla
v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel,
34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127 (2007).
146. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001)).
147. Robert M.A. Johnson, Message from the President, PROSECUTOR, May–June 2001,
at 5.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
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information about deportation to bulletproof their convictions.151 The Court’s
new appreciation of prosecutorial discretion in bargaining is welcome.
The Court also showed an appreciation for how other bodies can help to
inform bargaining. One possibility is that rules advisory committees could
amend the rules of criminal procedure. At oral argument in Padilla, Justice
Kennedy repeatedly asked whether Rule 11 ought to be amended to warn
defendants about the possibility of deportation.152 The Court’s opinion noted
that almost half of states, by statute or rule, already warn defendants about
possible immigration consequences.153 But counsel argued, and the Court
appeared to agree, that while a generic warning at a plea colloquy may be
salutary, it is no substitute for counsel’s particularized advice.154 Other bodies,
such as sentencing commissions, can likewise play a role in tailoring and
updating the law, though Padilla did not involve nor address these issues.
D. The Erosion of Neat Dichotomies and Bright Lines
Padilla also recognized that modern criminal practice does not fit within
neat boxes. Important stages of criminal cases include not just trials, but also
investigation, negotiation, and advice. Many key events happen off the record,
and at oral argument Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito worried that
Padilla claims would require evidentiary hearings.155 Off-the-record events
likewise matter to other kinds of ineffective assistance claims, such as failure to
investigate mitigating evidence. Yet that difficulty has not prevented the Court
from applying Strickland to review those failures.156 If anything, judicial
scrutiny is all the more necessary precisely because proceedings are hidden and
off the record. Otherwise, lawyers may be tempted to cut corners and push
151. Though the Court did not note it, prosecutors have several other tools that they can use
to inform defendants and encourage plea bargains. They can detail the advantages and penalties
for defendants in their written plea agreements and at plea colloquies. Even when defendants
decide to plead guilty without an agreement, prosecutors can write letters detailing their
sentencing guidelines calculations and could just as easily detail collateral consequences. Cf.
United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1034 (2d Cir. 1991) (encouraging but not requiring
prosecutors to inform defendants of their likely sentencing guidelines calculations). And
prosecutors can conduct face-to-face reverse proffer sessions with defendants, detailing the
strength of the prosecution’s case and the benefits of a guilty plea. Bibas, supra note 29, at 2525.
152. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 13, 31, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)
(No. 08-651) (questions of Kennedy, J.).
153. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 n.15.
154. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 31, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)
(No. 08-651) (distinguishing courts’ Rule 11 warnings from lawyers’ Sixth Amendment duties to
advise).
155. Id. at 10–11, 18–19 (implying concern over the resource burden that such hearings
would place on the criminal justice system, and expressly noting the problems of fading memories
and competing accounts of off-the-record proceedings).
156. See supra text accompanying note 145 (noting the Court’s increased scrutiny over the
past decade of capital defense lawyers’ failures to investigate mitigating evidence relevant to
sentencing).
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clients to plead guilty quickly.157
The Court did not let floodgate fears dictate a narrow ruling. Instead, it
noted that Strickland’s bar is high and that no flood of claims had erupted after
Hill v. Lockhart extended Strickland to plea bargaining.158 To win, convicts
must show that rejecting the plea bargain would have been rational.159 Lower
courts are experienced at sifting meritorious from specious claims. And
experience confirms that defendants who plead guilty are much less likely to
challenge their convictions, as they would lose the benefits of their bargains
and risk worse outcomes.160 The Court’s holding reflected this accumulated
experience, rather than a bright-line rule closing the courthouse doors.
Padilla also poked a large hole in the wall between criminal and civil
proceedings, and that hole may lead the wall to crumble or collapse. Criminal
defense lawyers are appointed to represent defendants in their criminal cases,
not in all of their problems in life. But increasingly, criminal and civil law are
intertwined and shade into one another. Clients depend on lawyers to advise
them, and their advice within criminal cases must reflect various tradeoffs
and consequences. Civil consequences may be predictable or even automatic;
plea decisions within criminal cases can trigger large civil consequences.
Criminal defense lawyers must look ahead to clear immigration issues, just as
mergers and acquisitions lawyers cannot ignore obvious tax, antitrust, or
regulatory implications of their deals. The Sixth Amendment test should be
not whether a consequence is labeled civil or collateral, but whether it is
severe enough and certain enough to be a significant factor in criminal
defendants’ bargaining calculus.
Taking an apparently incremental approach, Padilla did not decide
whether to disavow the entire collateral-consequences doctrine that lower
courts had developed. It specifically limited its holding to deportation because
it is intertwined with the criminal process and hence nearly impossible to
classify as direct or collateral.161 But it relied on the ABA’s evolved
professional norms, which require advice at least about deportation.162 Future
cases may extend Padilla’s reasoning to demolish the collateral-consequences
doctrine more generally, focusing on the importance of particular consequences
rather than their criminal or civil labels. The bar no longer rigidly separates the
two fields, and neither does the Court.
Finally, the Court in Padilla did not differentiate between acts and
157. See Bibas, supra note 29, at 2475–76; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice
Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 58–59 (1988) (noting how much worse
agency-cost problems are in plea bargaining because of its low visibility and lack of reputational
sanctions for poor performance).
158. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484–85.
159. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
160. Id. at 1485–86.
161. Id. at 1481–82.
162. Id. at 1482–84.
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omissions; it forbade nonadvice as well as misadvice.163 The Sixth Amendment
guarantees not just freedom from state interference, but state-supplied
competent counsel.164 The state cannot imprison defendants without first
providing them with effective defense advocates. Strickland regulates both acts
and omissions.165 It gives defendants an affirmative right to information and
tactical advice so that they can make informed choices whether to plead
guilty.166 But a rule limited to affirmative misadvice would perversely
encourage defense lawyers to say nothing at all to avoid allegations of
ineffectiveness.167 Since we now live in a world where almost every right is
waivable, courts must police the standards for waiver and ensure good advice.
E. The Failure of Formalism and the Rise of Realism
The notable loser in this exchange was Justice Scalia and his brand of
formalist originalism. His dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, reprised his
Blakely and Crawford majority opinions, criticizing judicial construction of the
Constitution to solve contemporary problems.168 The Sixth Amendment, he
noted, originally was a negative right to hire counsel, which the Court had
extended into a positive right to effective counsel at government expense. He
thus implicitly questioned whether even Gideon and Strickland were right.169
Assuming arguendo that they were, he noted that the Sixth Amendment’s text
limits it to criminal prosecutions, not broader civil ramifications.170 And he
resisted the majority’s use of professional standards to shape constitutional
requirements for effective assistance.171 In other words, he would have
confined the Sixth Amendment to the issues implicated in founding-era
criminal trials. That approach would have neatly separated criminal from civil,
negative from positive, and professional from legal standards. Plea bargaining
would have been unregulated, left to caveat emptor and the flawed market
(even though plea bargaining did not exist in the eighteenth century).
As I have argued elsewhere, Justice Scalia’s originalist arguments often
seem at root to be driven by formalism rather than the other way around.172 At
163. Id. at 1484 (determining “that there is no relevant difference between an act of
commission and an act of omission in this context” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
164. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
165. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
166. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995).
167. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484.
168. Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ridiculing the majority for turning “[t]he
Constitution . . . [into] an all-purpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world” and noting
that we do not live “[i]n the best of all possible worlds”).
169. Id. at 1495 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, and Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 201–03 (offering this explanation for the ApprendiBlakely line of cases).
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the bottom of Justice Scalia’s argument was his fear of the slippery slope, of
opening Pandora’s box. The majority’s argument had “no logical stoppingpoint” and would lead to “years of elaboration” based on nothing but “judicial
caprice.”173 But a rule that depends on and follows an evolved consensus of the
bar is hardly arbitrary policymaking. Justice Stevens’s approach is an
incremental one familiar to the common law. It considered the lived experience
of bar norms and state legislation and procedures before reaching out to solidify
them into a rule.174 It will indeed require future elaboration. But that temporary
uncertainty is a cost worth bearing to protect the 95 percent of defendants who
rely on their lawyers’ advice when pleading guilty.
The more powerful counterarguments against the Padilla majority were
not formalist or originalist but pragmatist, exemplified by Justice Alito’s
concurrence in the judgment, joined by Chief Justice Roberts.175 At oral
argument, Justice Alito surprised this author by expressing some sympathy for
Padilla’s plight. At the same time, he worried about the difficulties of
reconstructing attorneys’ advice and disproving misadvice claims at evidentiary
hearings years later.176 And he asked whether the Court could classify the types
of consequences that call for advice and those that do not.177
Justice Alito rejected Justice Scalia’s approach of caveat emptor. His
opinion drew Justice Scalia’s ire for recognizing that the Sixth Amendment
forbids misadvice and requires at least very general warnings about
deportation.178 That approach, like the majority’s, is not a bright line and would
have required elaboration. His concerns were intensely practical ones about
criminal defense attorneys’ limited expertise.179 Immigration law is complex,
and bar publications themselves note that “nothing is ever simple with
immigration law.”180 In other words, Justice Alito accepted the majority’s
pragmatic frame of reference and the importance of the bar’s accumulated
wisdom, but disputed its conclusion on its own terms.
Justice Alito further contended that the majority’s rule headed off statutes,
plea forms, and procedural rules that had been developing more flexible
solutions in many states. The majority’s new rule risks upsetting many criminal
convictions, he objected, whereas nonconstitutional solutions would not be as

173. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482-83.
175. Because Chief Justice Roberts did not write separately and did not say much at oral
argument, one cannot know why he joined Justice Alito’s pragmatic concurrence. It is possible
that his joining exemplifies how Justice Alito’s prosecutorial perspective is influencing his
colleagues, but that is sheer speculation—it is impossible to tell.
176. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No.
08-651) (questions of Alito, J.).
177. Id. at 54 (questions of Alito, J.).
178. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1487–91 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
180. Id. at 1490.
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disruptive.181 No federal court of appeals had gone as far as the majority, so the
Court should hesitate to venture that far, whereas lower courts are quite used to
reviewing claims of misadvice.182
Finally, Justice Alito did not limit his frame of reference to jury trials. In
recognizing that the Sixth Amendment forbids misadvice, he rightly worried
that “incompetent advice distorts the defendant’s decision-making process.”183
If misadvice skews the contracting process, “the defendant can[not] fairly be
said to assume the risk . . . [of] indirect consequences of which he or she is not
aware.”184 Even absent misadvice, Justice Alito would have required general
deportation warnings and express disclaimers, so defendants would know to
consult with immigration lawyers.185 In other words, Justice Alito evinced
concern for informing and regulating the contracting process well before trial.
His reasoning contained the seeds of important consumer protections, including
disclaimers and warnings.
In short, Justice Alito’s approach was intensely pragmatic. It did not seek
refuge in bright lines, textual exegesis, or eighteenth-century visions of jury
procedures. It grappled seriously with the bar’s expertise and norms. It
reflected upon the practical problems of delving into immigration law and
disrupting convictions. It also heeded the unfairness of making defendants
decide in the dark. Though he is often lumped together politically with Justice
Scalia and was even derided as “Scalito,” Justice Alito’s concurrence differs
greatly from Justice Scalia’s dissent in tone, focus, and outcome.186 His realism
befits his experience as a federal prosecutor, just as Justice Scalia’s bright-line
formalism reflects his scholarly bent as a former academic.
Though the evidence is hazier, the other former prosecutor on the Court
may likewise be showing her realistic streak. The first three questions to
respondent’s counsel were posed by Justice Sotomayor.187 She emphasized that
a guilty plea is not just a factual statement of guilt, but a conscious, strategic
decision to sacrifice rights.188 That choice among risky alternatives must be
informed, particularly when a defendant signals that he cares about deportation
and asks for advice. Though she did not write separately, the majority opinion

181. Id. at 1491. Justice Scalia’s opinion also nodded towards these concerns about
experimentation and alternatives. But he tacked them on briefly at the end, almost as an
afterthought, rather than making them the heart of his dissent. Id. at 1496–97 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
182. Id. at 1491–94 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
183. Id. at 1493.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1494.
186. See Ann Althouse, Op-Ed., Separated at the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at A27
(questioning the common, condescending conflation of the two jurists by the use of this epithet).
187. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–37, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)
(No. 08-651) (questions of Sotomayor, J.).
188. Id.
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accords with her realism about how and why defendants plead guilty and may
reflect her influence.
In the end, the two ex-prosecutors on the Court reached different
conclusions, but their shared vocabulary and competing concerns framed the
debate.189 The needs and norms of the twenty-first century, not the neat boxes
of the eighteenth, define Padilla. That is quite a turnaround from seven years
ago, when Justice Scalia’s formalist originalism seemed to triumph in
Crawford and Blakely.
Now, it remains to be seen whether the Court will persist in this nascent
trend; one swallow does not a spring make, nor one fine day.190 Padilla could
turn into a jurisprudential dead end, an outlier limited to its egregious facts.
Particularly with the departure of Justice Stevens, the author of the majority
opinion in Padilla, one cannot know whether the Court will persist in this
direction.191 Justice Kagan, for example, has yet to show her hand or her
methodology in deciding criminal cases. But one may dare to hope that the
bright-line rule of caveat emptor is in retreat, and that the project of consumer
regulation and tactical guidance has begun.
IV.
CONSUMER REGULATION OF PLEA BARGAINING
A solid majority of the Court has thus begun to soften caveat emptor.
Instead, it recognizes that defendants need protections to ensure that their pleas
reflect accurate information and competent tactical advice. The Court’s past
constitutional rulings on plea bargaining have prompted nonconstitutional
reforms building on their base. For example, after the Court expressly approved
of plea bargaining, Rule 11 required judges to elicit plea bargains and put them
on the record.192 And while Boykin required mentioning only three
constitutional rights at plea colloquies, Rule 11 has codified and expanded
189. That tentative assessment may become clearer in future cases if, for example, the
Court confronts the buying of cooperator testimony in exchange for leniency. One could imagine
Justices Alito and Sotomayor debating the need to crack the mob’s code of silence versus the
proven risk of false testimony. A recent petition for certiorari was a missed opportunity for just
such a debate: it asked the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of cooperation
agreements that require cooperating witnesses to testify consistently with their prior statements in
order to earn leniency. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Bannister v. Illinois, No. 09-1576, cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 638 (2010).
190. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 17 (F.H. Peters trans., C. Kegan Paul & Co.
1881) (“If one swallow or one fine day does not make a spring, neither does one day or any small
space of time make a blessed or happy man.”). English translations often substitute “summer” for
the original “spring” in this proverb.
191. But see supra note 117 and text accompanying notes 108–09 (discussing Premo v.
Moore as a partial continuation of Padilla’s plea-bargaining realism).
192. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 & Advisory Committee Note (1974) (citing Brady and
Santobello’s approval of plea bargaining as justification for bringing plea bargains out into the open
and regulating them in new subsection (e), which has since been renumbered as (c)); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752–53 (1970); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
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Boykin’s advisories. Today, it prescribes many more advisories.193 Rule 11 now
requires warnings and waivers of procedural rights, as well as a minimal factual
basis for pleas.194
Rule 11 is a form of consumer regulation, but it is limited and ineffective. It
emphasizes the waived procedures of theoretical trials, not the pros and cons of
various substantive plea outcomes. What defendants need is more robust
consumer protection, much like the laws that regulate consumer contracts. The
Constitution requires only one layer of protection, but Padilla pours a foundation
that should prompt legislatures and rules committees to build more layers.
Indeed, developing flexible nonconstitutional responses might obviate
further constitutional reforms. That would invert Justice Alito’s fears about
constitutionalizing this area and stifling development. Better information and
tactical advice could head off the need to ban certain deals substantively, for
instance. Perhaps, then, Justice Alito should be especially supportive of
reforming the rules to address the problem he acknowledges. The Justices have
the power to do so. The Supreme Court, in its rulemaking capacity,
promulgates the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which many states copy
in large part.195 It bases the rules on the draft proposed by an advisory
committee, which seeks to reflect the wisdom of leading judges, lawyers, and
professors.196 Even now, the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee is considering whether to propose amending Rule 11 in light of Padilla.197 By pursuing
nonconstitutional consumer protections, the Court can complete the work of its
Padilla decision, experimenting without freezing one approach in place.
The remainder of this Part maps the contours of possible reforms. First,
Part IV.A considers the kinds of plea-bargaining protections that might
counteract chronic misunderstandings and irrationality. Then, Part IV.B
touches briefly on what roles various institutional actors ought to play in
implementing these reforms.

193. Compare Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (requiring affirmative waiver
on the record of the privilege against self-incrimination and the rights to jury trial and to confront
one’s accusers), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (requiring warnings not only about the three rights
required by Boykin but also about the rights to plead not guilty, testify, counsel, and compulsory
process, as well as the danger of prosecution for perjury, the existence of any appeal waiver, the
various penalties, and the existence of sentencing guidelines). See generally supra text
accompanying note 30 (discussing Boykin and Rule 11’s requirements).
194. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). Likewise, the discovery obligations of Rule 16 and the Jencks
Act go well beyond Brady v. Maryland’s constitutional minimum. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(2006) (requiring disclosure of witnesses’ prior statements at trial), and FED. R. CRIM. P. 16
(requiring a series of disclosures of inculpatory evidence upon request of the defendant), with
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (recognizing defendant’s due process right to
disclosure of exculpatory evidence that is material to guilt or punishment).
195. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
196. See id. § 2073(a)(2), (b).
197. Conversation with Nancy J. King, Reporter, Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sept. 23, 2010).
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A. The Content and Format of Plea Protections
In much of Europe, consumer regulation specifies or forbids a wide
variety of substantive terms.198 In the United States, substantive consumer
regulation is limited. Far more prominent is a series of procedural regulations
designed to ensure that consumers understand and consider carefully the most
important terms of their bargains. So, for example, the Truth in Lending Act
requires clear, standardized disclosures of annual percentage rates (APRs),
finance charges, fees, grace periods, and treatment of credit balances.199 The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires clear, simple disclosures of warranties
to shoppers before purchases.200 The Uniform Commercial Code requires
disclaimers of certain implied warranties to be conspicuous. It also specifies
phrases such as “as is” or “with all faults” that suffice to disclaim implied
warranties.201 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulations guarantee consumers a three-day cooling-off period to rescind purchases made from door-todoor salesmen.202 And various deceptive trade practices acts regulate misleading or high-pressure sales tactics.203 These disclosure rules have not abolished
deception and misunderstanding, but surely they are better than nothing.
It is astonishing that a $100 credit-card purchase of a microwave oven is
regulated more carefully than a guilty plea that results in years of
imprisonment. It would not take much to extend the consumer protection
analogy to plea bargains. Legislatures and rules commissions could forbid
some terms outright. Mostly, however, they would regulate the contracting
process procedurally to ensure a modicum of understanding and advice.
Many cognitive deficits plague plea bargaining and merit fixing. Probably
the most basic is sheer incomprehension because defendants often are
unsophisticated laymen facing repeat-player prosecutors. Many defendants also
feel pressured to make hurried decisions based on advice by lawyers whom
they may not yet have come to trust. Defense lawyers are often overburdened,
of varying ability and experience, and may have incentives to plead cases out
quickly. Framing, anchoring, and loss aversion are also factors. Overconfidence
and impulsivity probably play lesser roles because impulsive, overconfident

198. See, e.g., Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, c. 50 (U.K.); Council Directive 93/13, On
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EC).
199. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1614 (2006). Regulation Z, implementing
the statute, is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2011).
200. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2006). The Federal Trade
Commission’s regulations implementing the act are codified at 16 C.F.R. § 700 (2011).
201. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3) (2007) (specifying rules for disclaimers of implied warranties
in general and for implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose in
particular).
202. 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2011).
203. E.g., REVISED UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1966); Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2006) (authorizing the FTC to make rules forbidding
unfair or deceptive acts or practices).
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defendants are more likely to go to trial or hold out for better deals.204 Solutions
should attack each of these problems, especially poor defense lawyering and
incomprehension, followed by excessive pressure to plead quickly. The
following list is not meant to be a comprehensive blueprint for legislation, but
rather an effort to brainstorm about possible solutions.
Improving Comprehension. The most basic and important reforms focus
on ensuring that defendants know what they are doing. Most critically, they
need better defense lawyers, as I will discuss, and simpler, clearer plea
bargains.205 But for starters, all plea agreements should be in writing. While
many plea bargains are written down, not all are.206 Their terms may be set
forth at the plea hearing in full, in part, or not at all. Simply memorializing all
agreements in writing, ahead of time, would go a long way toward reducing
confusion and later evidentiary disputes about what was promised or
understood. A simple check-the-box form with blanks for the defendant’s
name, the charge(s), and the sentence might suffice for simple misdemeanors
and the like.
Another comprehension problem is that innumeracy hinders defendants’
grasp of the risks of various outcomes, such as the chance of various
convictions or sentences after trial. Following standard best practices for
translating numbers into common-sense terms can help. Psychological research
shows that displaying numerical information visually, and phrasing risks in
absolute rather than relative terms, help people to understand risks better. It is
also important to use standard numerical formats and to reduce the number of
calculations and inferences that readers must make.207 For example, lawyers
and plea agreements could phrase sentencing ranges not as 126 to 144 months
but as 10 ½ to 12 years. A bar graph could then show how that range stacks up
alongside the likely sentencing range after trial, based on recent post-trial
sentences in similar cases in that jurisdiction. Worksheets could also disclose

204. For discussions of how these cognitive biases and heuristics warp plea bargaining, see
generally Bibas, supra note 29, at 2496–2527.
205. Of course, simplicity competes at least somewhat with thoroughness. Pleas should
ideally cover all the important consequences a defendant will likely face, without injecting a
distracting mound of trivial considerations. That balancing requires judgment calls trading off
simplicity against thoroughness. The touchstone should be the accumulated experience of the
bench, bar, and academy about which terms matter most to defendants in practice and how best to
express them simply and clearly.
206. E.g., Ex parte Yarber, 437 So. 2d 1330, 1336 (Ala. 1983) (“We are unaware of any
requirement that the [plea] agreement be reduced to writing.”); State v. Thrift, 440 S.E.2d 341,
348 (S.C. 1994) (holding that “oral [plea] agreements are perfectly enforceable”).
207. See, e.g., Hannah Faye Chua et al., Risk Avoidance: Graphs Versus Numbers, 34
MEMORY & COGNITION 399, 407 (2006); Ellen Peters et al., Numeracy Skill and the
Communication, Comprehension, and Use of Risk-Benefit Information, 26 HEALTH AFF. 741,
744–46 (2007); Isaac M. Lipkus & J. G. Hollands, The Visual Communication of Risk, 25 J.
NAT’L CANCER INST. MONOGRAPHS 149, 159–160 (1999); Paul Slovic et al., Affect, Risk, and
Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S35, S37–S38 (2006).

05 Bibas.doc (Do Not Delete)

2011]

REGULATING THE PLEA-BARGAINING MARKET

7/5/2011 8:47 PM

1155

parole eligibility and similar standard terms. Computerized fill-in forms could
ensure correct calculations tied to the crimes of conviction.
Clear numbers should be accompanied by clear language. To improve
defendants’ comprehension, drafting commissions could require summaries of
agreements in plain English. Studies consistently show that laymen understand
very little of the boilerplate legalese in jury instructions and the like. Rewriting
legalese in simpler, shorter terms using the active voice increases readers’
understanding markedly.208 The American Law Institute or the Uniform Law
Commission could draft legible disclosure forms in plain English, similar to the
standard boxes and tables disclosing credit-card rates, grace periods, billing
cycles, and fees. They could include reasonable standard terms as defaults.
Prosecutors would remain free to bargain for nonstandard terms, but those
could face closer scrutiny and regulation. For example, prosecutors sometimes
ask one defendant to plead guilty in exchange for lenient treatment of a close
relative, but these terms are often criticized as coercive.209 For such package
deals, prosecutors might have to display the provisions in large, boldfaced type,
specifically discuss them at plea colloquies, and have defendants initial those
paragraphs individually.210 That would both improve defendants’ understanding
and perhaps offset one of the most coercive pressures to plead.
Moderating Pressures. Defendants often face great pressure to plead out
quickly, which may lead them to make life-altering decisions before they come
to appreciate the consequences. One way to reduce this pressure would be a
cooling-off period for plea bargains authorizing five years’ imprisonment or
more.211 The law could forbid guilty pleas at the initial appearance for serious
felonies, to avoid pressure to plead immediately after first meeting with one’s
defense lawyer. It could also require prosecutors to disclose the deal’s terms
and defense lawyers to offer advice at least three days before the plea hearing,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to allow an immediate plea. (The
208. See Amiram Elwork et al., Toward Understandable Jury Instructions, 65 JUDICATURE
432, 434–39 (1982); Robert F. Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975
B.Y.U. L. REV. 601, 606, 614–18; Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury
Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 79–93 (1988)
(summarizing empirical studies); David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A
Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 480–83 (1976).
209. See, e.g., People v. Fiumefreddo, 626 N.E.2d 646, 650–53 (N.Y. 1993) (scrutinizing
carefully but approving deal in which adult daughter pleaded guilty to murder in exchange for a
light sentence for her father). See generally Bruce A. Green, “Package” Plea Bargaining and the
Prosecutor’s Duty of Good Faith, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 507 (1989) (scrutinizing the ethical
problems posed by package plea bargains).
210. Cf., e.g., State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 542–43 (Minn. 1994) (requiring disclosure
by prosecutors and careful colloquy by trial courts on package-deal terms of plea agreements).
211. One could require cooling-off periods for all pleas, but because they could be
cumbersome, it makes sense to reserve them for the highest-stakes cases where defendants may
feel the most pressure to jump at a deal. Moreover, cooling-off periods in minor cases could force
petty offenders who did not make bail to remain in jail longer instead of pleading guilty in
exchange for time served.
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final plea deal might need to be put on the table a week before trial, to allow
time for advice and avoid pressure for last-minute deals.) Cooling-off periods
help to make decisions more dispassionate and to reduce second-guessing of
rash snap judgments. They are most valuable when (1) people make a decision
infrequently and are therefore inexperienced, and (2) the decision is an
emotional one.212 Felony guilty pleas satisfy both criteria.
Construction of Terms. To counterbalance prosecutors’ repeat-player
advantages, the law could also construe nonstandard terms more strictly.
Contract law often employs the canon of construing ambiguous terms contra
proferentem, that is, against the party who drafted them.213 Plea bargaining law
could apply this canon more vigorously.214 Prosecutors are repeat players and
can draft plea agreements to minimize ambiguity. If they want to draft contracts
containing nonstandard terms, then prosecutors ought to be crystal clear or risk
having any ambiguities construed against them. If, for example, prosecutors
want defendants to forfeit crime-related property, they ought to spell out
specifically what property is to be forfeited. Issues will arise on which ex ante
precision is impossible, such as the definition of good-faith cooperation in an
undercover investigation and subsequent testimony. There, agreements ought at
least to set benchmarks for performance as clearly as possible.
Prosecutorial Disclosure. In addition to rules of construction, prosecutors
might be subject to certain disclosure obligations, even when defendants decide
to plead guilty without plea agreements. The Second Circuit, for example,
encourages prosecutors to send defendants letters setting forth their
understandings of how the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines should apply to each
defendant’s case.215 These Pimentel letters, as they are called, give defendants
fair warnings of the sentences they are likely to receive in exchange for their
pleas and any enhancements that arguably apply.216 Other mandatory
disclosures could cover concurrent versus consecutive sentencing for all
pending charges, as well as possible or mandatory parole, supervised release,
212. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 250–51 (2008) (giving as examples cooling-off periods for
high-pressure door-to-door sales and also mandatory waiting periods for divorces).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) (“In choosing among the
reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally
preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom the writing
otherwise proceeds.”).
214. Some courts already apply the contra proferentem canon to plea agreements. United
States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 552 (3d Cir. 2002) (summarizing cases). More recently, however,
courts have been treating that canon in private litigation, and the analogous rule of lenity in
criminal litigation, as last-resort tiebreakers and not as weighty independent considerations.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Science: Scientific Evidence–and Statutes, 43 CRIM. L. BULL.
739, 753 (2007).
215. United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1034 (2d Cir. 1991). Though the absence of
a Pimentel letter would not necessitate reversal, the presence of one would create a safe harbor
against claims of misunderstanding or misadvice about Guidelines calculations.
216. See id.
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civil commitment, and asset forfeiture. These disclosures would help to inform
defendants’ decisions about whether (and how) to plead guilty.
Prosecutors and courts could likewise have to clarify the consequences
defendants face in other ways. For example, they ought to notify defendants of
possible departures from presumptive sentences. They might also have to
consolidate all outstanding cases for sentencing, so defendants have a
comprehensive picture of the exposure they face. Indeed, the ABA’s Standards
for Criminal Justice: Sentencing already require both of these steps.217
More generally, plea bargains could take a page from the law of default
terms. There is an extensive literature on the possibility of using informationforcing and penalty defaults in ordinary contracts.218 These doctrines can
induce parties to disclose information and discuss possibilities to which they
might not otherwise have adverted. In this context, one might make default
terms standard and somewhat prodefendant. This way, repeat-player prosecutors would explicitly set forth the more proprosecution terms they were proposing, prompting defendants and defense counsel to focus on and think about
them. That approach would encourage careful written records of agreements
instead of oral understandings that risk disputes and forgetfulness later on.
For instance, because the parties might not consider the possibility of
breach, defaults would prod the parties to specify what constitutes a breach and
what remedies could serve as liquidated damages. Today, some plea agreements
simply ask defendants to waive their rights to appeal without further
explanation.219 Others, however, specify that defendants are waiving their rights
to appeal any sentence below a set number except on specified grounds.220
Courts ought to be more willing to uphold specific waiver terms, which ensure
that waivers are knowing, but could construe vague waivers narrowly.
Framing. Difficult issues surround the decision of which frame or
baseline to use. Possibilities include the defendant’s current status (either
freedom on bail or imprisonment pending trial) or the expected post-trial
sentence. The choice of a baseline on which to anchor greatly influences
whether defendants view bargains as gains (to be locked in) or losses (worth
gambling to avoid). The same is true of probabilities: it matters greatly whether
217. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING 18-5.15,
18-5.16 (3d ed. 1994).
218. The literature on the topic is far too vast to catalogue here, and there is significant
debate about whether penalty default rules exist or differ from those based on the parties’
hypothetical intents. The seminal article on the topic is Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
219. E.g., United States v. Guevara, 941 F.2d 1299, 1299 (4th Cir. 1991) (upholding an
explicit waiver of a defendant’s “right to appeal her sentence [under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)] or on
any” other grounds).
220. E.g., COMM. ON SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS, FED. BAR COUNCIL, PROFFER, PLEA AND
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT at C-4, C-14, C-15, C-31, C-36, C-62
(2003) (reprinting standard-form plea agreements used by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the
District of Connecticut and the Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western Districts of New York).
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defense counsel describes a 15 percent chance of acquittal at trial or an 85
percent chance of conviction. The choice of baselines is never neutral, so plea
bargainers can manipulate bargains to make them seem like gains or reduced
losses depending on whether they want them to seem attractive or not.221 It is
not clear that there is a single baseline that best tracks defendants’ wishes in a
world of perfect information. So perhaps the default ought to be a socially
optimal one, framing plea bargains consistently as gains relative to trial
outcomes, nudging defendants towards pleas. Whether to require that framing
or merely make it a default starting point depends on how much one fears that
lawyers manipulate frames for self-serving ends.
Improving Defense Lawyering. Most important of all would be the advice
of counsel. Defendants must trust their lawyers because they cannot begin to
learn enough and their lawyers are experts. Defense lawyers may need training,
guidance, and reminders to ensure that they advise their clients competently.
Bar associations could help to address this concern by developing best practices
for advising defendants on guilty pleas.222 Checklists or computer programs
could flag typical collateral consequences of which defense lawyers must warn,
based on each defendant’s charges, jurisdiction, immigration status, address,
and job. They could do the same for defense lawyers’ duties to investigate,
prepare, meet with clients, and advise. Checklists sound too obvious to be
much of a change, but they would offer much more concrete guidance than
current law. Strickland shied away from rules or even rules of thumb to guide
defense lawyers and lower courts, making review difficult and prey to the
inevitability bias.223 As Dr. Atul Gawande has argued, checklists remain an
underused solution to the modern problem of extreme complexity. They remind
professionals to avoid common errors by going by the book.224 These measures
are incremental, practical starting points. One can at least hope for more radical
reforms, such as alleviating the chronic underfunding, overwork, and agency
costs that plague appointed defense counsel.225

221.
222.

See Bibas, supra note 29, at 2507–19.
See AM. BAR ASS’N, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 19-2.1 (3d ed. 2004) (calling for jurisdictions to
compile all collateral consequences); UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION
ACT § 4 (2009) (same).
223. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89, 696 (1984); Stephanos Bibas, The
Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004
UTAH L. REV. 1, 5–6. But see Blume & Neumann, supra note 145 (noting that, in regulating
defense counsel’s investigation of mitigating evidence at capital sentencing, the Court has
increasingly looked to bar guidelines).
224. ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT (2009).
225. I have previously discussed these problems. A partial solution, I have suggested, is to
concentrate criminal-defense appointments among public defenders (as opposed to appointed
private lawyers) to maximize the benefits of repeat-player knowledge and experience. See Bibas,
supra note 29, at 2476–86, 2534, 2539–40.
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Perhaps counterintuitively, the relatively small-bore proposals I have just
outlined may help lead to broader-based reforms. In objecting to Padilla’s
disclosure requirement, Justice Scalia feared that the Court’s opinion would
foreclose better legislative regulation of plea bargaining.226 But increased
transparency and disclosure may have a different effect on legislatures. If full
disclosure of overly harsh collateral consequences causes many defendants to
balk at pleading guilty, prosecutors may press for reforms. They may urge
legislatures either to curtail collateral consequences, or at least to make them
waivable as part of plea bargains, to avoid gumming up the plea-bargaining assembly line. Alternatively, they may press legislatures to give them even bigger
sticks with which to threaten higher post-trial penalties and so coerce pleas.
Now, there is a danger in analogizing plea bargains too closely to the law
of contracts. Plea bargains are not simple bilateral deals; they should also
respect victims’ and the public’s sense of justice. The more that prosecutors
must do before imposing a penalty, the more they can behave strategically and
omit terms to dictate lower outcomes. Perhaps some terms ought not be within
prosecutors’ control to remove the possibility of their being used as pleabargaining chips. But if certain terms are out of prosecutors’ control, judges
must carefully advise defendants about any mandatory terms that trump
purported bargains to prevent surprise.
The point here is not so much to come up with specific solutions as to
prod more creative thinking. Plea bargains are hugely important yet complex
legal products that are beyond the power of many defendants to navigate
unaided. Though that market is deeply flawed by agency costs and structural
and psychological distortions, neither complaining nor wishing will make it
disappear.227 It is here to stay and cries out for practical reforms. Clear
disclosures, reasonable standard terms, careful drafting and construction, and
competent advice would improve this market. Boilerplate disclosures and
consumer protections may not work wonders in practice, but they would be
better than nothing. Even if these changes do not dictate substantive terms,
they can help somewhat to make the bargaining process fairer, clearer, and
better informed.
B. The Contributions of Various Institutional Actors
I have already alluded to the roles that lawyers and judges could play in
this scheme. As noted just above, line prosecutors and judges might have
various disclosure obligations. Rules of construction might prod prosecutors to
spell out unclear terms. Judges would read unclear or nonstandard agreements

226. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496–97 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. See generally Bibas, supra note 29 (advocating practical reforms within the real world
of guilty pleas).
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vigorously against the drafter. Line defense counsel could use checklists and
training in plea bargaining.
As Part III.C suggested, the institutional picture should be more complex
than just the two courtroom attorneys and one judge. Legislatures and rules
advisory committees could restructure the processes of discovery and the
substance of plea colloquies. Supervisory prosecutors could play important
roles in promulgating office policies and standard-form plea agreements. They
could review these materials with care. They could also ride herd on line
prosecutors to prevent high-pressure tactics such as exploding offers and
unconscionable threats or bluffs. Supervisory defense lawyers could regularly
inquire about the problems faced by their subordinates and aggregate their
feedback. As repeat players, they can tell supervisory prosecutors about
problems with individual prosecutors or office policies that have the effect of
leaving defendants bewildered or pressured. Supervisory defense lawyers and
bar associations can also train new defense lawyers by giving them the
checklists and guidance they need.
The most important yet neglected role may lie with sentencing
commissions. What defendants need is not another Rule 11 boilerplate litany,
but accurate, intelligible information about the likely sentences they face after
plea versus after trial. Commissions could be pivotal in creating the sort of
standardized information about typical sentencing outcomes that ought to
dominate the substance of warnings. They could consult with graphic designers
and marketers to devise simple, intelligible ways to represent the ranges of
average sentences for various crimes. They could also test-market various
formats on ex-cons to see which formats most effectively counteract various
biases and heuristics. For example, maybe graphical frequency distributions
could offset defendants’ overoptimism, or maybe it would be better to offer
vignettes with photos of past defendants who assumed they would do better
than average.
The broader point is that higher-level institutions would bring a new
perspective to consumer protection in plea bargaining. Supervisory prosecutors,
supervisory defense counsel, bar authorities, rules advisory committees,
legislatures, and sentencing commissions can collect data broadly, see
problems synoptically, and address them proactively. The aim is not to blame
bad apples but to put systems in place to detect patterns of problems and
prevent future ones. The Supreme Court cannot do this on its own, but one
hopes that Padilla will spur other institutions to build on Padilla’s recognition
of the problem.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is finally beginning to grapple with the difficulty of
historical change. We have superimposed a modern criminal procedure market
upon a colonial Bill of Rights meant for jury trials. For decades, the Court
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barely regulated plea waivers. The managerial mindset emphasized the need to
process large caseloads efficiently, and originalists cared little about
proceedings beyond jury trials and sentences. Though Justice Scalia’s formalist
originalism crested early in the last decade, it showed little influence on other
Justices in Padilla. That may be because the newer Justices see the world not as
theoretical ex-professors but as pragmatic ex-prosecutors. In Padilla, both
Justices Alito and Sotomayor cared less about historical juries and slippery
slopes than about practical guidance and reasonable, workable rules. That is
now the Court’s center of gravity and the focus of debate in the middle of the
Court. It remains to be seen, of course, how Justice Kagan will change that
balance; she replaces Justice Stevens, whose common-law incrementalism
prevailed in Padilla, yet lacks his private-practice experience.
Assuming that it continues, the Court’s pragmatic incrementalism reflects
lawyers’ and defendants’ need for practical guidance. The Court need not
devise constitutional rules from whole cloth in a handful of unrepresentative
cases that reach it. Instead, it can piggyback on the accumulated wisdom of the
bench, the bar, and the academy. Academics can offer novel suggestions, and
the bar can experiment with them. Over time, a consensus can evolve, much as
the common law did. Rules advisory committees, and the Court in its
rulemaking capacity, can then codify that consensus. Flexible, nonconstitutional consumer-protection measures can evolve upon the Court’s constitutional
foundation. If egregious errors nevertheless persist, the Court can eventually
develop constitutional common law to rein in outliers. That pragmatic,
incremental approach to constitutional change is far more promising than a
novel judicial fiat or a completely laissez-faire approach to proven injustices.
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